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DAVID A. McPIIIE (2216) 
McPHIE & NELSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2105 East Muiray-IIolladay Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
(801) 278-3700 
Dy 
APR 7 1995 
<ii%jMb--~ — 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
OLETTA CUMMINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 92 490 3713 DA 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
—ooOoo— 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Iwasaki in his Courtroom 
located at 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 6th day of March, 1995, at the hour 
of 8:30 o'clock a.m. The Plaintiff appeared in person and through her attorney of record, David 
A. McPhie. The Defendant appeared personally and through his attorney of record, Earl 
Spafford. 
The court noted that the Default of the Defendant had been previously entered, and his 
and his answer stricken as part of the court's previous order signed on the 17th day of February, 
1995. 
The Plaintiff testified concerning jurisdiction and grounds, and in support of the other 
allegations of her complaint, and in some detail, concerning substantive matters. 
1 
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II This was done in an effort by the court, to provide the Defendant with a fair and equitable 
I 
I outcome in these divorce proceedings, even though he no longer has the right to participate in 
them, having previously had his answer stricken and his default entered. The court having 
I considered the testimony of the Plaintiff, the testimony of the accountant Stephen F. Petersen, 
j 
land a Motion to publish all volumes of the depositions of C. Kay Cummings having been 
j granted, and considering the testimony of the Defendant as contained therein, and documents 
I I 
j I submitted to the court in connection with these proceedings and as attached to the deposition, 
I 
! the file, and good cause appearing therefore, now publishes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
i (1) The parties are husband and wife having been married on the 1st day of July, 
j | 1954, in Salt Lake City, State of Utah. 
j (2) The parties have been married continuously ever since, or for a period of forty 
(40) years. 
(3) The parties were both residents of Salt Lake County for the three month period 
I j immediately prior to the filing of this Divorce Complaint. 
I (4) During the course of this marriage the parties had born to them children, but that 
! all of their children are now emancipated adults. Therefore the court need not make findings 
jj concerning custody, child support, visitation, or an Order to Withhold and Deliver. 
(5) The parties began a candy company which was known as C. Kay Cummings 
i 
! Candy in approximately 1965. The court further finds that the parties have operated that candy 
2 
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!j company ever since, and that it has grown substantially in terms of physical size, and volume 
1: of business ever since. 
11 
i ; 
j i (6) T h e Plaintiff, Oletta Cummings , played a major role over the years in the building 
j , of the candy company by both working there a great deal of the t ime and by taking care of the 
|| 
11 children at home and in taking care of the home. 
I , 
| J (7) The court finds that in 1984, the parties incorporated the candy company (which 
II 
j had previously been their partnership) and the company became known as C . Kay Cummings 
1 I 
!j Candy, Incorporated. The court however, also finds that the parties have essentially run the 
:! corporation as though it were a partnership ever since its incorporation. T h e candy company 
II 
|| has always been a closely held family business with family members and principally the parties 
;
 i 
• holding all of the stock, and all of the executive positions in the corporat ion. T h e court further 
:: finds that the Defendant has had, and continues to have, total control of the business, regardless 
I of its corporate form. 
ji 
; i 
| (8) The court further finds that the parties have ignored corporate formalities to a 
|, large extent through the years. As one example, they have had few regular meetings of the 
board of directors. Only a few sets of minutes of meetings of the Board of Directors exist. 
T w o of the sets of minutes were created by the Defendant subsequent to the commencement of 
|! this d ivorce action. 
(9) T h e court finds that C.Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. is the alter ego of C . Kay 
ji 
II Cummings personally. The court also finds however, that there is no advantage to either party, 
ii 
: and it has not been requested by either party, that this court make an order concerning the 
ii 
I! legality, viability, or integrity of that corporation. The court does however , find that the it must 
h l| 
t 
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make some decisions concerning the parties respective rights in the corporations assets, and that 
;to protect the marital assets, the court must make some determinations as to the parties' 
respective offices and positions of control with regard to the corporation. Failure to do so on 
the court's part at this time would lead to allowing one party or the other, to eviscerate the 
court's proposed decree in this matter, and allow one party or the other to gain an unfair 
advantage or control over the other in post decree disagreements, which the court finds are likely 
to arise. 
(10) The court finds that Oletta Cummings served as a corporate officer in the 
j corporation, and was only recently, and after the commencement of these divorce proceedings, 
j i removed as a corporate officer by the Defendant. The court further finds that the removal of 
!j Oletta Cummings as an officer and member of the board of said corporation was not with proper 
11 
i | J notice and violated other corporate law formalities. The court further finds that all appointments 
h 
j[ of others as officers and directors of C. Kay Cummings Candy to have been without proper 
, i 
! | notice to the Plaintiff and in violation of corporate law. 
(11) The court makes these findings for purposes of allowing the Plaintiff to protect 
her interests in the corporate assets which the court intends to give her as part of the Decree in 
this matter. The court further finds that should these steps be inadequate to give both parties 
equal power and authority over corporate assets further post Decree of Divorce steps may need 
to be taken. The court further finds that the parties are each one-half owners of all the stock 
jj of C.Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. 
(12) The court finds that the business, which originally was commenced by the parties 
in Sugar House, grew and that in approximately 1984, the parties purchased land located at 2057 
ft ft 1 2 9 8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. The court further finds that the parties later, through 
i! 
:; an industrial revenue bond, obtained a loan and built a building on the land located at 2057 East 
I 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and that they subsequently moved the C.Kay Cummings 
| j 
j Candy business into that building. 
(13) The court finds that the building, the land, and all the equipment, and assets, have 
been appraised by a court ordered appraiser, one David Posey, who is an accountant, who has 
i! | relied on sub-appraisers as to the value of the real estate. The building has been appraised as 
'). being worth $587,748.00 and the land as being worth $105,000.00. The court further finds that 
i these values are in some question but that neither party has objected thereto. On the other hand, 
I! the court finds that neither party agrees that $397,000.00 is the earning capacity of the business, 
i 
; and that Mr. Cummings has stated in deposition, and to the Plaintiff in person, that he believes 
the appraised value of the business to be worth more than $1,000,000.00. The Plaintiff testified 
!
 at the time of the default hearing and that with thirty years experience in the business, she 
thought it to be worth in excess of $1,000,000.00 also. The court also finds that the appraiser's 
; valuation of the business itself (not the building or land) defined as earning capacity is 
j incongruent with the Defendant's income from the business as referred to in paragraph 30 below. 
ij 
11 The court finds the value of the business itself (not including the real estate) to be $600,000.00. 
il 
;t The court finds that the land has a value of $105,000.00, and the building to have a value of 
$587,748.00 based on the appraisals. The court further finds that the building and real estate 
have $235,000.00 owed on them to First Security Bank of Utah. 
(14) The court finds that the real estate on which the candy company building is built 
and where the business is transacted is in the name of the parties as joint tenants and always has 
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(been. The court further finds that the parties have leased that land to the business over the 
years, and that at one time they had a written lease agreement. Said land lease agreement 
provided that each of the parties would be paid $500.00 per month. The court further finds that 
in recent years, the parties have orally agreed to a land lease payment from the business to them 
personally at $1,500.00 each per month ($3,000.00 per month total). The court makes no 
finding as to what the fair lease value of the land and/or building to the business is, but finds 
I that by the course of conduct, $1,500.00 each per month from C.Kay Cummings, Inc. to the 
Plaintiff and Defendant has become the agreement of the parties. 
(15) The court further finds that during the course of the litigation in this case which 
has extended over a period of approximately two and one-half years, the Defendant has totally 
controlled the business, C.Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. The court further finds that C. Kay 
I Cummings Candy, Inc. is currently behind in its land lease obligation to Oletta Cummings for 
! the months of September 1992 through December 1992, January 1993 through December 1993, 
! January 1994 through May 1994, and December 1994 through September 1995, for a total 
! 
I arrearage spanning twenty-four (24) months and a total arrearage in the amount of $36,000.00. 
I 
• (16) The court further finds that the Defendant was ordered to pay Oletta Cummings 
$1,663.00 per month as and for temporary alimony early in these proceedings. This has been 
j the order of the court for a period of approximately two and one-half years. The court further 
I finds that the Defendant has tried during the divorce proceedings to get credit against his 
I monthly temporary alimony obligation by sending checks to the Plaintiff marked land lease 
payment, and not sending a separate alimony check to her in the $1,663.00 per month amount. 
The court further finds that the Plaintiff has obtained on two separate occasions judgments 
6 
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I! 
I; against the Defendant including attorney's fees arrearages in the alimony obligation and that the 
\\ court on two prior occasions found that the temporary alimony obligation, and the land lease 
ij 
: obligation of the Defendant to the Plaintiff are separate obligations, and that the Defendant is 
i 
J not entitled to credit for one against the other. 
I (17) The court finds that the parties discussed the idea of a Family Trust in 1984 when 
|j candy business was incorporated. The court further finds that the notion of a family trust was 
I I referred to in some of the documents surrounding the financing of the building and that the 
11 
j | parties signed a stock certificate at the time the business was incorporated which purported to 
l| 
ji transfer the stock of the corporation to a family trust. The court finds however, that no trust ii 
i 
i! existed at the time of that transfer and that therefore the purported stock transfer was null and 
!! 
j I of no effect. The court further finds that at the time the stock transfer document was executed 
; by the parties, it was anticipated that a subsequent family trust which was yet to be formed, 
II would contain provisions jointly agreed on by the parties. The Court finds that there was no 
ii 
j I subsequent agreement or formation of a joint trust. The court further finds that the Defendant, 
i! 
j! 
| by himself, subsequent to the incorporation and the document purporting the transfer of each of 
;! the parties corporate stock to a trust, created his own trust. The court finds that the Defendant 
11 could not or did not obtain the signature of his wife on that trust agreement. The court further 
I j finds that the Defendant then attempted to create a trust by himself by being the sole trustor and 
j trustee. The court also finds that although the Defendant had the power to create and fund a 
| trust by himself, he did not by himself have the power to put his wife 's share of marital assets 
into his own personal trust. 
Ij (18) The court further finds that it must make findings with regard to the validity of 
Ii ;J 
I 7 
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j j the purported Cummings Family Trust referred to immediately above in that the Defendant has, 
.
!i 
1
 since a relatively early time in these proceedings, maintained that a family trust exists, and that 
I! much of the marital property of the parties is in that trust, and that it is therefore outside the 
! l 
! ) 
ii reach of the court. The court further finds that in the fall of 1993, while this divorce was 
;! 
! j pending, and after nine years of ignoring the claimed trust, the Defendant unilaterally and 
'I 
jj without notice to anyone, after nine years of being the sole "trustee" of the "trust," attempted : 
'! I 
!! appoint two co-trustees, had trust letterhead printed, and opened a trust account. All of these i 
!j ! 
| activities were the first interest shown by the Defendant in the trust that the Defendant in nine 
ii years time, and only after the divorce action was commenced. The court further finds that in 
l! 
i , 
ji the fall of 1993, when this divorce had been pending for approximately one year, the Defendant 
jj 
j j then had his purported newly appointed co-trustees file an action through separate counsel to try 
!! and intervene in this divorce action to protect the assets of the so called trust. The court notes 
i I 
jj that this matter of intervention was heard first by the court's commissioner for domestic matters, 
Michael S. Evans, and that pursuant to the rules concerning intervention, the Commissioner 
made a recommendation that the trustees not be allowed to intervene. That recommendation was 
appealed to this court and subsequently sustained. In so doing the court then found and now 
finds that the Defendant, as the original trustee, and a continuing "trustee" under the Defendant's 
alleged trust, could adequately represent the interest of the trust in the divorce litigation, 
reserving to the Defendant the right to call his alleged co-trustees, or other witnesses at the time 
of trial. The court further finds that the Defendant had no bank account of any kind for the trust 
for approximately nine years from 1984 to 1993. That there was no trust letterhead, and that 
no trust business was conducted. That the trust filed no tax returns until 1993 when the 
0«1SC? Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
! Defendant began to realize the weakness of his trust c la im, at which t ime he opened trust 
11 11 
h account , had letterhead printed, and began to file trust re turns . 
It 
ij (19) T h e court further finds that the Defendant , established o r a t tempted to establish 
l| 
IS another trust l ike entity in the late 1980 's or early 1990 ' s , giving a new trustee, namely one 
Is 
:; F r a n k Pond Reese , control over aspects and assets of the candy company , which the Defendant 
I has c laimed were transferred earlier into the 1984 trust. Tha t the cour t finds this behavior is 
! \ inconsistent with the notion that the 1984 trust ever existed, even in the mind of the Defendant. 
! i 
! i 
I I T h e cour t finds that no other non-business related, non-mari ta l assets , we re ever put into the 
; j 
\\ " t rust ." T h e court finds that the Cummings Family Trus t does not now exist , specifically that 
= i 
j the trust that the Defendant purported to try and establish by himself in 1984 never existed, and 
; i 
! l 
i 
that none of the assets of the candy company or the parties a re n o w , or ever were , transferred 
;| from the control of the shareholders , or owners of C .Kay C u m m i n g s Candy , Inc . T h e court 
j i 
! further finds that each of the parties hereto each own one-half of the C .Kay C u m m i n g s Candy, 
\ | Inc . stock and that they each own personally one-half of the land, bui ld ing , and business located 
jj at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, which serves as the premises of the Candy 
ij 
ii C o m p a n y . 
i j 
j (20) T h e court further finds that each of the part ies personal ly o w n one-half of all other 
|i 
: | assets of the C .Kay C u m m i n g s Candy, Inc . including investment accounts , bank accounts , motor 
i ; 
i j 
jj vehicles , equipment , stock, materials, accounts receivable and contracts , and any other property 
; | of any description wheresoever situated located at the 33rd South location or at the foothill store. 
I j (21) T h e court finds that over the years , and especially since the commencemen t of this 
i 
ii 
II act ion, the Defendant has kept income in the business as taxed but undistr ibuted income. T h e 
9 
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court further finds that the amount of money shown on the business tax return for 1993 for 
previously taxed but undistributed income is $288,946.00. The court further finds that the 
|! $288,946.00 is money the Defendant has chosen to keep in the business and under his control 
ji 
ij rather than to share with his wife. 
|! (22) The court finds that the parties acquired a home and real estate during the 
ji marriage located at 1134 E. Herbert Ave, Salt Lake City, Utah, which is currently paid for. 
11 The court further finds that said home and real estate is worth approximately $127,000.00. 
i| 
!l Further, the court finds that said home was purchased by the parties from the Plaintiffs parents 
II 
h on favorable terms due to the relationship existing between the Plaintiff, Defendant, and the 
jj Plaintiff s parents. 
I (23) The court further finds that the parties have been separated for more than two 
|; years, and that the Plaintiff has resided in the home since the date of the parties separation. The 
I court finds that the parties have largely divided between them the personal property that was 
|j located in the house in a manner which should be confirmed by the court, awarding to each of 
I ! | | 
ij the parties those items of personal property currently in their possession as their sole and 
i i 
j j separate property, free and clear of any claim of the other party subject only to exceptions which 
li are otherwise specified herein. 
(24) The court finds that the coin collection (silver coins) and the stamp collection, 
»' have values of $422.00 and $1,129.80, respectively and that these should be awarded to the 
I Defendant who collected them. 
(25) The court finds that the art work (paintings) of the parties have a value of 
|l 
|| $8,194.00 and should be awarded to Plaintiff. 
II 10 
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(26) The court finds that the parties should each be awarded one-half of all stocks, 
j bonds, and other investments acquired during the course of the marriage by the parties or either 
ii 
jj of them currently held or administered by Smith Barney, or First Western Financial Advisors, 
| or elsewhere regardless of the name the account may be in. These accounts currently have total 
|l 
11 market value of $227,918.00 and each of the parties should be awarded $113,959.00 worth. 
j | 
j | The court finds that the known investments may be described as and have the values as listed 
I on Exhibit A attached hereto. 
(27) The court further finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded the 1993 Oldsmobile 
j as her sole and separate property free and clear of any claim of the Defendant. 
I j (28) The court further finds that each of the parties should be awarded approximately 
I j one-half of all other personal property acquired during the course of the marriage not otherwise 
j herein provided for. 
(29) The court finds that determining the Defendant's income is problematic. The 
jj business, C.Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., has had gross sales in 1992 and 1993 of $1,125,388.00 
| and $1,281,404.00 respectively. Although the Cummings personal tax returns show joint income 
jj of $151,064.00 and $205,760.00 for 1992 and 1993, the Defendant has chosen for the parties 
ii 
I I to live austerely, and has during the last two years of the divorce, while this divorce has been 
ii pending chosen to live in a small office at the candy store and to shower at a local gymnasium. 
ji In doing this, the Defendant has chosen for the parties, instead of taking income, to plow both 
j | parties share of the income back into the business as previously taxed and retained income as 
i referred to in paragraph twenty-one above. 
| j (30) The court finds that the Defendant's stated income at the time of deposition was 
11 
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jj unusually low. The court finds that this stated salary is artificially low, and is not reasonably 
i | 
J| or realistically connected to the amount of money that the Defendant could or would but for 
I! 
h these divorce proceedings, be taking out of the business income. The court further finds that 
|i 
;i determining income for support purposes may be different than for IRS purposes {Utah Code 
j | 
|! Anno. §7-45-7.5). The court further finds that a reasonable amount to attribute to the Defendant 
i ; 
! l 
I • as income, including a salary from the business without putting the cash flow and needs of the 
II business at risk is $160,000 per year or $13,330.00 per month gross. The court makes this 
i ' 
I : 
; | finding based on the testimony of Stephen F. Petersen who reviewed the tax returns of the 
I ; 
; business for 1992 and 1993, and the parties for 1992 and 1993, along with the full accounting 
jj of David Posey, and who testified at the time of the default hearing. 
! j 
i • 
!; (31) The court further finds that this finding in paragraph thirty immediately above is 
; unnecessarily difficult to make because the Defendant has refused to participate in the discovery 
ij 
I process in ways and to an extent which is documented elsewhere in the file and which ultimately 
! i 
i ' 
!; led to his answer being stricken and his default entered. 
I! 
! j (32) The court further finds that the Defendant has provided little information over the 
jj 
jj two and one-half year span of this case concerning his expenses. What little information the 
! j court does have was provided early in the divorce process during a time when the Defendant was 
ji 
I1 living at the candy store, apparently the Defendant has continued to live at the candy store 
jj during these divorce proceedings, obtaining his meals commercially, and showering at a local 
ji 
! gymnasium. The court finds that the Defendant cannot reasonably continue to live at the candy 
ji store, buy all his meals commercially, and shower at a gymnasium, and that he will ultimately 
ji choose, post decree of divorce, to live under less than such austere circumstances, and with no 
i j 
i | 
! 
I 1 2 
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I other information available from him but his original declaration of expenses on file, that his 
; monthly expenses are, or will reasonably be, $1,500.00 per month. J 
'! i 
|j (33) The court finds that the Plaintiff is employable but all her experience is at the | 
I candy company where she has developed experience in all phases of the candy business over a j 
M I 
! period of thirty plus years, the court finds that the Plaintiff at age sixty-four is not likely to be i 
11 retrained in another field or find a job that will pay her more than near minimum wage. \ 
II 
i i (34) The court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to both the $ 1,500.00 per month land 
l| 
jl lease payment for her one-half share of the real estate on which the business is located, and 
i i 
i' alimony in the amount of $ 1,663.00 per month which has been the temporary order of the court 
i I 
I! for two and one-half years. In making this finding the court notes that both parties need for 
! support has contracted to meet the money available based on the Defendant's unilateral decision 
; i 
:! 
j | to put the parties in an austerity mode during these divorce proceedings. That the Defendant 
!| has been under court order to pay $1,663.00 per month in alimony and under a contractual 
: i 
lj obligation to pay $1,500.00 per month additionally in land lease payments. The court further 
i j 
lj specifically finds that the $3,000.00 a month that the business has been paying for the land, 
l j 
j! ($1,500.00 to each party) may or may not be the fair monthly lease or rental value of the land 
1  
!j itself and is probably not the fair rental or lease value of the land and building. 
I j (35) The court further finds that the Plaintiff is unemployed She has historically had 
• expenses of $1,663.00 per month during these proceedings. The court finds that it is difficult 
|j to set an appropriate alimony amount in this case because of the Defendant's failure to 
| participate in the discovery process. The court notes that in making this alimony finding that 
|! the Defendant argued on more than one occasion that his temporary alimony obligation should 
13 
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! be lowered but in each instance the temporary alimony of $1,663.00 was upheld. The 
|| 
|! Defendant, with some prodding, has paid this amount for two and one-half years. The court 
j | 
11 finds that Mrs. Cummings is entitled to receive, on a permanent basis, $1,663.00 per month as 
; i 
i! 
j | alimony and the income she will receive from the ownership of the land and building, which the 
! I court intends to award her as her one-half of share of the marital assets. The court further finds 
il 
11 that C. Kay Cummings can, and has had in the past, the power to pay said alimony and to make 
ji 
j ! sure that C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. pays Oletta Cummings a lease payment on the building 
|j and real estate, whether it be $3,000.00 per month (both halves of the current payment) or some 
!l new amount based on fair value. 
|| 
J j (36) The court finds that the best thing for both parties would be to preserve the 
i i 
|j business, C. Kay Cummings Candy, as an ongoing concern operated by the Defendant. A sale 
11 
! I 
, i 
• j of the business assets is not an attractive alternative because the income producing capacity and 
;l 
!i blue sky of the business is closely tied to the Defendant operating the business himself, and 
i 
j; because of the specialty nature of the business. 
|j 
! j 
ji (37) With an eye to dividing the marital assets of the parties in a way which would 
|| allow the business to continue in operation and which is most nearly an equitable and 50/50 
| division, the court finds a division of the marital assets should be awarded as follows: 
I TO THE PLAINTIFF: 
a. The home and real estate located at 1134 Herbert Ave., Salt Lake City, 
(I Utah, in align with the value; Value: $127,000.00 
b. The ground located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, which 
J is the real estate on which the business building is located and the business is operated; 
14 
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Value: $105,000.00 
c. The building located at 2057 East 3300 South on the above described land 
on which the business is located; Value: $587,748.00 
d. One half of the Smith Barney and First Western Advisors investment 
II accounts with values totaling $227,918.00, or $113,959.00 to her. 
I! 
j j e. All personal property currently located in the home and real estate at 1134 
jj 
|j Herbert Avenue, including the jewelry in the Defendant's possession (the collateral), with the 
11 exception of the stamp collection and coin collection. 
Estimated value at the time of hearing: $ 25,000.00 
TOTAL TO PLAINTIFF $997,707.00 
T O T H E DEFENDANT: 
\\ a. All of the equipment, materials, stock, accounts receivable, and other 
l j 
I- personal property of C.Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., including Blue Sky, the van, and the 
ji ongoing right to operate the business in the name of C.Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. plus the 
previously taxed income retained by the business. 
Retained Earnings: (previously taxed) $288,946.00 
Business Value: (without real estate) $600,000.00 
Total Estimated Value: $888,946.00 
b . All the Defendant's clothing and personal effects and personal property 
I j currently in his possession including the stamp and coin collections; but not the jewelry referred 
i 
l| 
to above; Value: $ 5,000.00 
15 
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I c. One half of Smith Barney and First Western Advisors stock and retirement 
II accounts ; Value: $113,959.00 
TOTAL TO DEFENDANT: $1,007,905.00 
(38) The court further finds that the business C. Kay Cummings Candy has in addition 
jj to paying the $1,500.00 per month to each party as a land lease payment, has been making the 
|! 
jj payment to First Security Bank of Utah for the financing on the land and/or building (current 
j i 
l| balance approximately $235,000.00). The court finds that the Defendant should assume and pay 
jl debt on the land and building as his sole and separate debt, and hold the Plaintiff harmless 
thereon. 
I (39) The court finds each of the parties should execute all documents needed to carry 
jj out the intent of these findings and decree based thereon 
| (40) The court finds that the plaintiff has asked the court for and received from the 
!j court prior judgments for temporary attorney's fees, which have been paid by the Defendant. 
i The court further finds that in addition to the fees which have been previously awarded and paid, 
I the Plaintiff has reasonably incurred the sum of $2,920.00 in additional attorney's and paralegal 
j fees, and $300.00 in additional costs of court for professional witnesses who testified at the time 
of the default hearing, namely Stephen F. Petersen. 
J Having published the above findings of fact the court now makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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(1) The Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce dissolving the bonds of 
matrimony previously existing between the parties. The same to become final upon the signing 
and entry thereof. 
(2) The Decree of Divorce should adopt and be congruent with the Findings of Fact 
outlined above. 
(3) The trust the Defendant attempted to create in 1984 does not now exist, never 
existed, and was never funded with marital assets or otherwise. 
(4) Oletta Cummings is the Vice President and a member of the Board of Directors 
of C.Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., having never been removed from those offices. 
lis / DATED this day of 
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SMITH BARNEY INC. 
.CCOUNT #: 508-14165 
C: LARRY BRADSHAW 
ACCOUNT POSITION SUMMARY 
AS OF 02/07/95 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS AND 
OLETTA W. CUMMINGS JT TEN WROS 
1134 HERBERT AVENUE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105-1511 
UNPRICED SECURITIES 
MONEY FUNDS 
FIXED INCOME 
MUTUAL FUNDS 
INS/ANN 
ACCOUNT VALUE* 
10,233.66 
16,047.55 
14,115.31 
11,756.60 
52,153.12 
00131? 
VALUE DOES NOT INCLUDE UNPRICED SECURITIES. 
IS INFORMATION IS BEING PROVIDED AT YOUR REQUEST AND DOES NOT REPLACE OR SUPERSEDE YOUR SMITH BARNEY INC. CUSTOMER 
CEMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS BASED UPON THE MARKET VALUE OF YOUR ACCOUNT AS OF THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS AND IS SUBJECT 
DAILY MARKET FLUCTUATION. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben lark Law School, BYU. 
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SMITH BARNEY INC. PAGE 1 
lOUNT #: 508-14165 
: LARRY BRADSHAW 
ACCOUNT POSITIONS 
AS OF 02/07/95 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS AND 
OLETTA W. CUMMINGS JT TEN WROS 
1134 HERBERT AVENUE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105-1511 
QUANTITY SECURITY DESCRIPTION 
10,199 
10,000 
929 
10,000 
5,000 
SMITH BARNEY MONEY FUNDS INC 
34.50 ACCRUED DIVIDED 
LIFE INS COMP. OF VIRGINIA 
SB MANAGED MUNI FD CL A 
28.84 ACCRUED DIVIDED 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH ARPT REV 
FGIC INSD-AMT-REG DTD 4/1/89 
7.875 12/01/1997 P/R@ 102.00 
795576CK10R0 12/01/2018 MAT 
PRICE 
1 . 0 0 0 
1 . 1 7 5 
1 5 . 1 5 0 
1 0 8 . 5 9 8 
MARKET VAL 
$ 1 0 , 2 3 3 . 6 6 
$ 1 1 , 7 5 6 . 6 0 
$ 1 4 , 0 8 6 . 4 7 
$ 1 0 , 8 5 9 . 8 0 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH ARPT REV 
-REG- FGIC INSD -AMT-
DTD 3/1/90 CALLABLE 
7.25 07/01/2020 
103.755 $5,187.75 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE* $52,124.28 
VALUE DOES NOT INCLUDE UNPRICED SECURITIES. 
IS INFORMATION IS BEING PROVIDED AT YOUR REQUEST AND DOES NOT REPLACE OR SUPERSEDE YOUR SMrTH BARNEY INC. CUSTOMER 
VTEMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS BASED UPON THE MARKET VALUE OF YOUR ACCOUNT AS OF THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS AND IS SUBJECT-
DAILY MARKET FLUCTUATION. 
«« i3 i3 
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SMITH BARNEY INC. 
ACCOUNT POSITION SUMMARY 
AS OF 02/07/95 
ZCOUNT #: 508-64352 *** CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS 
:: LARRY BRADSHAW SMITH BARNEY INC ROLLOVER CUST 
2057 EAST 3300 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84109-2630 
MONEY FUNDS 1,714.42 
STOCKS 17,281.25 
FIXED INCOME 9,950.00 
MUTUAL FUNDS 43,005.09 
UNIT TRUSTS 17,743.49 
ACCOUNT VALUE* 89,694.25 
/ALUE DOES NOT INCLUDE UNPRICED SECURITIES. 
S INFORMATION IS BEING PROVIDED AT YOUR REQUEST AND DOES NOT REPLACE OR SUPERSEDE VOUR SMITH BARNEY INC. CUSTOMER 
TEMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS BASED UPON THE MARKET VALUE OF YOUR ACCOUNT AS OF THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS AND IS SUBJECT 
DAILY MARKET FLUCTUATION. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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SMITH BARNEY INC. PAGE 1 
XOUNT #: 5 0 8 - 6 4 3 5 2 
:: LARRY BRADSHAW 
ACCOUNT POSITIONS 
AS OF 0 2 / 0 7 / 9 5 
*** CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS 
SMITH BARNEY INC ROLLOVER CUST 
2057 EAST 3300 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4 1 0 9 - 2 6 3 0 
QUANTITY SECURITY DESCRIPTION 
1,708 SMITH BARNEY MONEY FUNDS INC 
5.74 ACCRUED DIVIDED 
18,977 UNITS EQUITY INCOME FD CONCEPT 
TELE-GLOBAL TR SER 2 QRTLY PMT 
4,06 6 FRANKLIN CUST FD INCOME SER 
1,317 G T GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
350 MCDONALDS CORP 
200 QUESTAR CORP 
1,924 SB FUNDAMENTAL VALUE CL B 
EST FREE $ A/O 02/06 $1,627 
EST CDSC MAX CHARGE $365 
49 SB UTILITIES CL B 
EST FREE $ A/O 02/06 $89 
EST CDSC MAX CHARGE $17 
1.23 ACCRUED DIVIDED 
10,000 STANDARD CREDIT CARD TR 1990-4 
CL A PART CTF-DTD 5/2/1990-BK 
ENTRY-FINAL MTY OF 7/10/1996 
9.15 05/10/1995 
PRICE 
1 . 0 0 0 
. 9 3 5 
2 . 1 2 0 
1 5 . 0 9 0 
3 3 . 3 7 5 
2 8 . 0 0 0 
7 . 1 9 0 
MARKET VAL 
$ 1 , 7 1 4 . 4 2 
$ 1 7 , 7 4 3 . 4 9 
$ 8 , 6 2 0 . 2 2 
$ 1 9 , 8 8 6 . 8 0 
$ 1 1 , 6 8 1 . 2 5 
$ 5 , 6 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 1 3 , 8 3 3 . 7 3 
1 3 . 4 8 0 
9 9 . 5 0 0 
$ 6 6 3 . 1 1 
$ 9 , 9 5 0 . 0 0 
** MORE ** 
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SMITH BARNEY INC. PAGE 2 
CCOUNT #: 508-64352 
C: LARRY BRADSHAW 
ACCOUNT POSITIONS 
AS OF 02/07/95 
*** CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS 
QUANTITY SECURITY DESCRIPTION PRICE MARKET VA1 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE* $89,693.02 
VALUE DOES NOT INCLUDE UNPRICED SECURITIES. 
IS INFORMATION IS BEING PROVIDED AT YOUR REQUEST AND DOES NOT REPLACE OR SUPERSEDE YOUR SMITH BARNEY INC. CUSTOMER 
ATEMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS BASED UPON THE MARKET VALUE OF YOUR ACCOUNT AS OF THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS AND IS SUBJECT 
DAILY MARKET FLUCTUATION. 
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SMITH BARNEY INC. 
COUNT #: 
:: LARRY 
508-25686 
BRADSHAW 
ACCOUNT POSITION SUMMARY 
AS OF 02/07/95 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS TTEE 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS FAMILY TR 
D/T/D 12/14/84 
2057 E 3300 S 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84109-2630 
CASH ACCT BAL 
FIXED INCOME 
ACCOUNT VALUE* 
127.08 
4,721.80 
4,848.88 
VALUE DOES NOT INCLUDE UNPRICED SECURITIES. 
US INFORMATION IS BEING PROVIDED AT YOUR REQUEST AND DOES NOT REPLACE OR SUPERSEDE YOUR SMrTH BARNEY INC. CUSTOMER 
?ATEMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS BASED UPON THE MARKET VALUE OF YOUR ACCOUNT AS OF THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS AND IS SUBJECT 
3 DAILY MARKET FLUCTUATION. 
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SMITH BARNEY INC. PAGE 1 
ACCOUNT POSITIONS 
AS OF 02/07/95 
CCOUNT #: 508-25686 CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS TTEE 
C: LARRY BRADSHAW CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS FAMILY TR 
D/T/D 12/14/84 
2057 E 3300 S 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4 1 0 9 - 2 6 3 0 
QUANTITY SECURITY DESCRIPTION PRICE MARKET VAI 
5,000 CLARK CNTY NEV IMPT TRANSN 94.436 $4,721.80 
G/O LT MBIA INSD SER C BK ENT 
OID-DTD 7/1/94 F/C 12/1/94 
6.10 06/01/2015 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE* $4,721.80 
VALUE DOES NOT INCLUDE UNPRICED SECURITIES. 
IS INFORMATION IS BEING PROVIDED AT YOUR REQUEST AND DOES NOT REPLACE OR SUPERSEDE YOUR SMITH BARNEY INC. CUSTOMER 
VTEMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS BASED UPON THE MARKET VALUE OF YOUR ACCOUNT AS OF THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS AND IS SUBJECT 
DAILY MARKET FLUCTUATION. 
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SMITH BARNEY INC. 
ACCOUNT POSITION SUMMARY 
AS OF 0 2 / 0 7 / 9 5 
COUNT # : 5 0 8 - 1 4 4 5 6 ***OLETTA W. CUMMINGS 
: LARRY BRADSHAW SMITH BARNEY INC IRA CUSTODIAN 
1134 HERBERT AVENUEH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105 
MONEY FUNDS 2 2 . 3 7 
STOCKS 3 , 8 7 5 . 0 0 
FIXED INCOME 9 , 9 2 1 . 2 8 
MUTUAL FUNDS 3 , 0 5 5 . 6 7 
ACCOUNT VALUE* 1 6 , 8 7 4 . 3 2 
VALUE DOES NOT INCLUDE UNPRICED SECURITIES. 
IS INFORMATION IS BEING PROVIDED AT YOUR REQUEST AND DOES NOT REPLACE OR SUPERSEDE YOUR SMITH BARNEY INC. CUSTOMER 
VTEMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS BASED UPON THE MARKET VALUE OF YOUR ACCOUNT AS OF THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS AND IS SUBJECT 
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SMITH BARNEY INC. PAGE 1 
CCOUNT #: 508-14456 
C: LARRY BRADSHAW 
ACCOUNT POSITIONS 
AS OF 02/07/95 
***OLETTA W. CUMMINGS 
SMITH BARNEY INC IRA CUSTODIAN 
1134 HERBERT AVENUEH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105 
QUANTITY SECURITY DESCRIPTION 
22 SMITH BARNEY MONEY FUNDS INC 
.02 ACCRUED DIVIDED 
1,441 FRANKLIN CUST FD INCOME SER 
200 PACIFICORP 
4,000 STRIPS-TINT-U S TREASURY 
0000 11/15/1996 
4,000 STRIPS-TINT-U S TREASURY 
0000 08/15/1997 
4,000 STRIPS-TINT-U S TREASURY 
0000 11/15/1998 
PRICE 
1 . 0 0 0 
2 . 1 2 0 
1 9 . 3 7 5 
8 8 . 4 6 9 
8 3 . 5 6 3 
7 6 . 0 0 0 
MARKET VA1 
$ 2 2 . 3 7 
$ 3 , 0 5 5 . 6 7 
$ 3 , 8 7 5 . 0 0 
$ 3 , 5 3 8 . 7 6 
$ 3 , 3 4 2 . 5 2 
$ 3 , 0 4 0 . 0 0 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE* $16,874.32 
VALUE DOES NOT INCLUDE UNPRICED SECURITIES. 
IIS INFORMATION IS BEING PROVIDED AT YOUR REQUEST AND DOES NOT REPLACE OR SUPERSEDE YOUR SMITH BARNEY INC. CUSTOMER 
ATEMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS BASED UPON THE MARKET VALUE OF YOUR ACCOUNT AS OF THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS AND IS SUBJECT 
) DAILY MARKET FLUCTUATION. 
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02-08-1995 0: PM FIRST WESTERN flDUISORS 101 ilJD^y r.Kle: 
02/08/1995 
FIRST WESTERN ADVISORS Cash Flow Analysis 
DAVID A. RUSSON 
V.P. INVESTMENTS 
PORTFOLIO OWNER: Cumraings, K. (IRA) 
ACCOUNT NUMBER: 0775654 
Security 
Description Quantity Value 
Cash 
Flow 
% of 
Yield Holdings 
MAINSTAY TOTAL RET'N 
PHOENIX GROWTH FUND 
214.172 3,283.26 
210.275 4,283.30 
8 0 . 7 4 
6 5 . 1 9 
2,5% 
1.5% 
43.4% 
55.6% 
PORTFOLIO TOTALS: 7,566.56$ 145.93 1.9% 100.0% 
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02/08/1995 
FIRST WESTERN ADVISORS Cash Flow Analysis 
DAVID A. RUSSON 
V.P. INVESTMENTS 
PORTFOLIO CWNER: Cuiranings, O. (IRA) 
ACCOUNT NUMBER: 0455125 
Security 
Description Quantity Value 
Cash 
Flow 
% of 
Tield Holdings 
MAINSTAY TOTAL RET'N 
PHOENIX GROWTH FUND 
21.834 334.72 
126.826 2,583.45 
8.23 2.5% 11.5% 
39.32 1.5% 8-3.5% 
PORTFOLIO TOTALS: $ 2,918.16$ 47.55 1.6% 100.0% 
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02/08/1995 
FIRST WESTERN ADVISORS Cash Flow Analysis 
^^r^-gr*^r*^r*'^rtr,,*'?'TS?r?^g*"q."gaa,TBg.?riTT??rfflit' 
DAVID A. P.USS0N 
V.P. INVESTMENTS 
PORTFOLIO OWNER: Cununings, Joint Acct 
ACCOUNT NUMBER: 05544122 
Security 
Description Quantity Value 
KEMPEIi HIGH YIELD B 640.231 4,884.96 
KEYSTONE LIQUID TRST 11,393.510 11,393.51 
PUTNAM GROWTH & INC 627.041 8,352.19 
Cash 
Flow 
484.01 
398.77 
376.22 
% of 
Yield Holdings 
9.9% 
3.5% 
4.5% 
19.8% 
4S.3% 
33.9% 
PORTFOLIO TOTALS: $ 2 4 , 6 3 0 . 6 6 $ 1 , 2 5 9 . 0 1 5.1% 1C:J.0% 
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02/08/1995 
FIRST WESTERN ADVISORS Cash Flow Analysis 
DAVID A. RUSSON 
V.P. INVESTMENTS 
PORTFOLIO OWNER: Cummings Family TRST 
ACCOUNT NUMBER: 548888 
Security 
Description Quantity Value 
Cash 
Flow 
% o f 
Y i e l d H o l d i n g s 
FID. ADV/ H-Y MUNI 2 , 5 5 3 . 1 1 1 2 9 , 2 3 3 . 1 2 2 , 0 7 3 . 1 3 7.1% 100.0% 
PORTFOLIO TOTALS: $ 2 9 , 2 3 3 . 1 2 $ 2 , 0 7 3 . 1 3 7.1% 100.0% 
TOTAL P.02 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS AND 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DECREE OF DIVORCE to the following, 
postage prepaid this jJJMay of K M t / i A ., 1995: 
Earl Spafford 
Trolley Corners 
Suite 3-A 
515 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
/ 
M'Lisa D. Rius 
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DAVID A. McPIIIE (2216) 
McPHIE & NELSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2105 East Murray-Holladay Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
(801) 278-3700 
1 | i ; n i , » ! . * • / • ! •'•'• ( 
APR 7 1995 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-—ooOoo— 
OLETTA CUMMINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 924903713 DA 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
-ooOoo— 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Iwasaki in his 
courtroom located at 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on Monday the 6th day of 
March, 1995, at the hour of 8:30 o'clock a.m. The Plaintiff appeared personally and by and 
through her attorney of record, David A. McPhie, The Defendant also appeared personally and 
through his attorney of record, Earl Spafford. 
The Plaintiff testified as to jurisdiction and grounds and other substantive matters in 
support of her proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as did the Certified Public 
Accountant, Stephen F. Petersen. A Motion was made for the publciation of all volumes of the 
deposition of C. Kay Cummings. Said Motion was granted. 
The Court having considered the file, the testimony, the deposition of C. Kay Cummings, 
1 
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I 
i 
| the documents submitted to court in connection with the default hearing and as attached to the 
\\ depositions, and good cause appearing therefore, and having previously published its Findings 
is 
ii of Fact and conclusions of Law, now makes the following: 
i| 
|i ORDER, JUDGMENT, DECLARATIONS, & DECREE 
i i 
| 1. The Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, the same to 
| j become final upon the signing and entry hereof. 
j i 
; I 2. The Court makes no Order concerning the custody of children or related issues in that 
|! all the minor children of the parties are emancipated. 
j | 3. The Plaintiff is awarded $1,633.00 per month as and for alimony. Said alimony shall 
l j 
h terminate upon the Plaintiffs death or remarriage, or as otherwise provided as a matter of law. 
i -
i j 4. The Defendant is ordered to cooperate with the Plaintiff to maintain her on his current 
| i policy of health and accident insurance, which he currently has through his place of employment, 
ii 
11 and to cooperate with her to extend to her said coverage under the "Cobra" provisions of federal 
j ; 
j! law as long as it may be maintained. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay her share of the premium 
i | 
j i for said coverage. 
| 5. The Court declares the Cummings Family Trust that the Defendant attempted to 
i 
I] establish in 1984 void ab initio. 
11 6. The Court declares the actions taken to remove Oletta Cummings as an officer and 
I; 
|! director of C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., void. The court declares Oletta Cummings to be 
, i the vice-president of such corporation and a member of its Board of Directors. 
i| 
ii 
I" 2 
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7. The Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against the Defendant, C. Kay Cummings, 
personally and the Corporation, C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. for arrearages in land lease 
payments in the amount of $36,000.00. The Defendant and the corporation shall be jointly and 
severally liable for the judgment. 
8. The Plaintiff is awarded further judgment against the Defendant in the amount of 
$2,857.31 for reasonable attorney and paralegal fees. All previous temporary awards of 
attorneys fees are affirmed. 
9. The Defendant is ordered to pay or, to cause to be paid to the Plaintiff, by C. Kay 
l Cummings, Inc., the sum of $3,000.00 per month as ongoing rent or lease payment on the 
\' property and building, located at 2057 East 3300 South, until such time as the fair monthly 
i ; 
I leasehold value of the land and building can be agreed upon or established by court order. 
! i 
j ! 10. The Plaintiff is awarded the following property as her sole and separate property, 
; I free and clear of any claim of the Defendant: 
|j 
j| A. The home and real estate located at 1134 Herbert Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
B. The ground located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, in which 
the business building is located. 
C. The building located at 2057 East 3300 South, located on the above described 
land. 
D. One-half of the First Western Advisors and Smith Barney Accounts, as 
described in the Findings of Fact with values totaling $227,918.00 or 
$113,959.00, to her. 
mnr* 
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E. All personal property currently located in the h o m e and real estate located at 
ij 1134 Herbert Avenue , Salt Lake City, Utah and the j e w e l r y currently in the 
1  
11 Defendant 's possess ion (the collateral) , but exempt ing out the stamp and coin 
jj co l lect ions , which are awarded to the Defendant . 
J 11 . T h e Defendant is ordered to assume and pay the debt and obl igation o w e d to First 
l 11 
i Security Bank o f Utah on the land and building on 3 3 0 0 South, w h e r e the candy business is 
|j located in the amount o f approximately $ 2 3 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 as his so le and separate debt, and to hold 
j the Plaintiff harmless from any liability thereon. 
i | 
! j 12 . T h e Defendant is ordered to immediately execute and del iver to the Plaintiff Quit 
| Cla im D e e d s to the house , land and building described above . T h e Defendant is further ordered 
!; 
ij to cause C . Kay C u m m i n g s Candy, Inc . , or the so-cal led "Cummings F a m i l y Trust" to also 
| j 
h execute said Quit Claim D e e d s to the Plaintiff as may be necessary. 
, i 
|! 13. The Defendant is awarded the fo l lowing property: 
i ! 
i! A . All o f the equipment, materials, stock, accounts rece ivable , retained earnings, 
i I 
j and other personal property o f C. Kay C u m m i n g s Candy , I n c . , including the 
i 
! van, blue sky, and the on-go ing right to operate the bus iness in the name o f 
j 
I C . Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. 
!| B. All o f the Defendant's clothing and personal ef fects , and personal property 
|j 
| currently in his possess ion, except the j e w e l r y referred to above . The 
i || 
j | Defendant is awarded the stamp col lect ion and co in co l l ec t ion , referred to 
I 
j above. 
C. One-half of the Smith Barney and First Western Advisors stock and retirement 
4 
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accounts. 
14. Except as provided for above, each of the parties is ordered to assume and pay 
their own debts and obligations incurred subsequent to separation, which was in July 1992, and 
hold the other harmless thereon. 
15. Should subsequent motions be brought before the court or its Commissioner for 
| enforcement of the terms of this decree, the substantially prevailing party shall be awarded all 
. their costs of court and actual and reasonable attorneys fees incurred in bringing said action or 
defending against it as the case may be. 
16. The Plaintiff is ordered stayed from taking action to collect the judgments awarded 
her herein for ten (10) days. 
DATED this is / day of y^ t /<L , 1995. 
BY THE COUR' 
0 fl ft 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Oletta Cummings, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Clyde Kay Cummings, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FILED 
DEC 1 9 1996 
COURT OF APPEALS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 950504-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 19, 1996) 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, Division I 
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Attorneys: M. Byron Fisher and James F. Wood, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
David A. McPhie, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Wilkins. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Appellant appeals the trial court's orders striking his 
answer, entering default judgment, and dividing the marital 
estate in response to his long-term failure to comply with court 
orders pertaining to discovery and other matters. The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in striking defendant's answer 
and entering his default given his repeated failure to cooperate. 
Marshall v. Marshall. 915 P.2d 508, 515 (Utah App. 1996). The 
other issues raised by appellant are likewise within the 
discretion of the trial court, with the possible exception of the 
treatment of the retained earnings in valuing the business, and 
the valuation of the business itself. 
Valuation and division of marital property wilr^iV8tji6t^» .v»:'ni sitVno 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretiony^and as lon&^jy^^ 
supported by adequate factual findings tci ^ reveal asis tor jurcw-
the trial court's conclusions. Rappleye v. Rappleye. 855 P.2d 
260, 263 (Utah App. 1993). In this case7-^he-find^fl^7^f(u^ict do 
not sufficiently explain the court's "equitable an^j^P^BQt^^} 
division" of the marital property in that the findings fail{3to 
address how much, if any, of the previously-tSXSd^ reSft^^i1 
earnings that were awarded to defendant may have also^been 
included in the value of the business. Itr i& unclear^whether, in 
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deciding this issue, the trial court actually considered the 
report of the court-appointed expert. The findings also lack 
sufficient detail as to how the court arrived at its valuation of 
the business. See id. 
Jtfe affirm in part, but remand for additional findings of 
jEact on the aforementioned^x^suaa^^^The: trial court may base its 
JzXndings on-the evidence now in the record, or'"'it may wish to 
take additional evidence. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Gorman H. Jack&jefa, Judge 
Michael J . W i l k i n s , Judge 
I, i.;. 
Appe. i
 a 
fu\T •"'om 
™)i,,!- ..irony 
LS* H- T rc,erk - ^ c f S S i sea,of 
Appeals, do herebv nartih, »h»* 4i. . ' " ' ? 0 I 
AnoT-i- "^ 7 - 1°' u e r k °' ,ui . ofthe Court. 
wnereo | tave S £ K L 2 A p J K s - ,n testimony Clerk of the Court 
j j - m j j have set my hand and affixed the seal of By 
i'wLAljUt yju[ JLAtA// Deputy Clerk 
Marilyn I 
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DAVID A. McPHIB(2216) 
Attorney at Law 
2105 E. Murray-Holladay Rd. 
Sail Lake Cily, Utah 84117 
(801)278-3700 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
£ f ,'• -,. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
OLETTA CUMMINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS, 
Defendant. 
^ 2 / U W 
ORDER ON THE PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTIONS FOR: 
1. ESTABLISHMENT OF A PAYMENT 
SCHEDULE, 
2. APPROVAL OF A LOAN, 
3. AN ORDER REQUIRING THE 
DEFENDANT TO SIGN A DEED OF 
TRUST, 
4. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 924903713 DA 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
-ooOoo— 
THE MATTER of the Plaintiffs Motions for the Establishment of a Payment Schedule, 
Approval of a Loan, an Order Requiring the Defendant to Sign a Deed of Trust, and Attorney's 
Fees came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki in his courtroom located 
at 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, on Tuesday, the 19th day of May, 1998, at the 
hour of 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
The Plaintiff appeared personally and through her attorney of record, David A. McPhie. 
The Defendant appeared personally and through his attorney of record, M. Byron Fisher. The 
1 
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Court heard argument, and proffers of evidence both in support of, and in opposition to the 
Motions. Having heard the matter fully, having considered the file, the arguments and proffers, 
and good cause appearing therefore, the Court now makes the following; 
ORDER ESTABLISHING A PAYMENT SCHEDULE 
1. The Defendant is ordered to pay at the time of closing on the Plaintiffs loan with 
Bank One, the difference between $320,000.00, and the amount owing on the note owed Helen 
Rappaport and Alan S. Cohen as of the date of closing. It is anticipated that this closing will take 
iplace before the end of May, 1998, and that the amount that Mr. Cummings will be required to 
pay if the matter were to close on the 20th of May, 1998, is $14,176.63. If it does not close on 
that date, it has been represented to the Court that the loan earns interest at a per diem rate of 
approximately $170.00 per day. 
2. The Defendant has until July 15, 1998 to establish a payment schedule for the 
payment of the remainder of the monies he was ordered to pay, that is the $39,000.00 penalty, 
and other sums, as a result of the Court's order made from the hearing dated April 13, 1998. 
3. Should the Defendant fail to come to an agreement with the Plaintiffs counsel for 
the payment of these sums on or before said date, the Court will then, again, entertain a motion 
for the Establishment of deadlines for payment. 
ORDER OF LOAN APPROVAL 
2 
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4. The Court hereby approves the loan which the Plaintiff has negotiated with Bank 
One which is for $320,000.00, at an interest rate of 9% per anum, amortized over 15 years, and 
with a call at the end of five years. It is anticipated that said loan has monthly payments of 
$3,245.68. 
5. The Plaintiff is hereby authorized to enter into said loan agreement and to close 
the same as soon as she is able. The Defendant shall be solely obligated to make the payments 
on said loan even though he is not a co-maker, and to make the loan payments in a timely 
manner. 
ORDER REQUIRING THE DEFENDANT TO SIGN A DEED OF TRUST 
6. The Defendant is ordered in connection with the closing of the loan referred to 
Bank One in paragraph 4 above, to sign a Deed of Trust as may be required of him to put Bank 
One in a first mortgage position with respect to the entirety of the real estate located at 2057 East 
3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
ORDER THAT THE DEFENDANT SIGN THE LISTING AGREEMENT 
7. The Defendant is Ordered to sign, as a co-owner of the real estate at 2057 East 
3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, the listing agreement authorizing Highland Realty to sell said 
real estate. 
3 
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ORDER ON A MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
8. The Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against the Defendant for attorney's fees in 
the amount of $500.00. 
DATED t h i s ^ v day of _ 
_, 1998. 
BYTHE€OURT: 
Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on the 
Plaintiffs Motions for: 1) Establishment of a Payment Schedule, 2) Approval of a Loan, 3) 
An Order Requiring the Defendant to Sign a Deed of Trust, 4) Attorney's Fees to the 
following, postage prepaid thisfrlfi^ Day of \}\ O^A^ , 1998: 
- * & 
M. Byron Fisher 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street, Suite 1200 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Sallyrlutchings (j 
D:\WP61\CLIENTS\CUMMINGS\ORD5-19.HRG 
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DAVID A. McPI I IK (2216) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2105 East Murray-Holladay Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
(801) 278-3700 
W 2 7 1W. 
Ocpu ?rk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
OLETTA CUMMINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
UPON REMAND 
Civil No. 92 490 3713 DA 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
—ooOoo— 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki in his 
Courtroom located at 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 6th day of March, 1995, at 
the hour of 8:30 o'clock a.m. The Plaintiff appeared in person and through her attorney of record, 
David A. McPhie. The Defendant appeared personally and through his attorney of record, Earl 
Spafford. 
The court noted that the Default of the Defendant had been previously entered, and his 
answer stricken as part of the court's previous order signed on the 17th day of February, 1995. 
The Plaintiff testified concerning jurisdiction and grounds, and in support of the other 
allegations of her complaint, and in some detail, concerning substantive matters. 
This was done in an effort by the court, to provide the Defendant with a fair and equitable 
1 
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outcome in these divorce proceedings, even though he had only a limited right to participate in them, 
having previously had his answer stricken and his default entered. 
The court considered the testimony of the Plaintiff, and the testimony of the accountant 
Stephen F. Petersen. A Motion to publish all volumes of the depositions of C. Kay Cummings was 
granted. The Court considered the testimony of the Defendant as contained therein, and documents 
submitted to the court in connection with those proceedings, and as attached to the deposition. The 
Court having considered the file, and good cause appearing therefore, the Court published its original 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and signed the original Decree of Divorce on the 7th day 
of April, 1995. 
The Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. The Court 
of Appeals remanded the matter back to the District Court for further proceedings on specific issues, 
on December 19, 1996.1 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki upon remand 
from the Court of Appeals on the 11th day of August, 1997, and again on the 22nd day of 
September, 1997. At the hearing on remand, the parties were present, and were represented by their 
legal counsel of record, David A. McPhie attorney for the Plaintiff, and M. Byron Fisher attorney 
for the Defendant. 
The court received testimony and reports and exhibits from the court appointed expert 
witness David T. Posey. Plaintiff and Defendant examined the witness David Posey through 
counsel, and subsequently the Court published its Amended Findings concerning the fair market 
A copy of the Court's Order on Remand is attached to these Findings as Exhibit A. 
2 
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value of the business known as C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. 
This matter came on for further hearing on the 19lh day of November, 1997, at the hour of 
1:30 o'clock p.m., where the court heard proffers of fact, and argument from counsel concerning the 
effect the Court's new Findings concerning the value of the business C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. 
should have on the overall distribution of property, and to consider the objections each party had 
filed to the other's proposed new Amended Findings. 
The Court having considered the arguments of counsel, and the proffers made, overruled the 
objections of the Defendant to the Plaintiffs proposed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. 
f The Court noted at the hearing on November 19, 1997, that it had previously, at the time of 
the original Decree, left open for further consideration the question, as to what the fair monthly 
rental or lease value of the building and real estate located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, was. 
The question of the fair monthly lease or rental value of the subject building came on for 
evidentiary hearing before the Honorable Judge Glenn K. Ivvasaki on the 13th day of April, 1998, 
at the hour of 2:00 o'clock p.m. The Plaintiff appeared in person and tlirough her attorney of record 
David A. McPhie. The Defendant appeared personally and tlirough his attorney of record M. Byron 
Fisher. 
The Court, after having heard the testimony, the arguments of counsel, and having received 
the stipulation of the parties, and good cause therefore, made its Finding concerning the fair market 
3 
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lease value of said building and real estate located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.2 
Having now conducted all hearings necessary to, and in connection with the issues on 
remand, and those issues which were previously reserved for further hearing, the Court now, 
publishes the following: 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON REMAND 
(1) The parties are husband and wife having been married on the 1 st day of July, 1954, 
in Salt Lake City, State of Utah. 
(2) The parties have been married continuously ever since, or for a period of forty (40) 
years. 
(3) The parties were both residents of Salt Lake County for the three month period 
immediately prior to the filing of this Divorce Complaint. 
(4) During the course of this marriage the parties had children born to them children. All 
of their children are now emancipated adults. Therefore the court need not make findings concerning 
custody, child support, visitation, or an Order to Withhold and Deliver. 
(5) The parties began a candy company which was known as C. Kay Cummings Candy 
in approximately 1965. The parties have operated that candy company since that date, and it has 
grown substantially in terms of physical size, and volume of business since then. 
(6) The Plaintiff, Oletta Cummings, played a major role over the years in the building 
A copy of the separate Findings and Order from that hearing is attached as Exhibit B. 
4 
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of the candy company by both working (here a great deal of the time and by taking care of the 
children at home and in taking care of the home. 
(7) The court finds that in 1984, the parties incorporated the candy company (which had 
previously been their partnership) and the company became known as C. Kay Cummings Candy, 
Incorporated. The court however, also finds that the parties have essentially run the corporation as 
though it were a partnership ever since its incorporation. The candy company has always been a 
closely held family business with family members and principally the parties holding all of the stock, 
and all of the executive positions in the corporation. The court further finds that the Defendant has 
had, and continues to have, total control of the business, regardless of its corporate form. 
I (8) The court further finds that the parties have ignored corporate formalities to a large 
! extent through the years. As one example, they have had few regular meetings of the board of 
directors. Only a few sets of minutes of meetings of the Board of Directors exist. Two of the sets 
of minutes were created by the Defendant subsequent to the commencement of this divorce action. 
(9) The court finds that C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. is the alter ego of C. Kay 
Cummings personally. The court also finds however, that there is no advantage to either party, and 
it has not been requested by either party, that this court make an order concerning the legality, 
viability, or integrity of that corporation. The court does however, find that the it must make some 
decisions concerning the parties respective rights in the corporations assets, and that to protect the 
marital assets, the court must make some determinations as to the parties1 respective offices and 
positions of control with regard to the corporation. Failure to do so on the court's part at this time 
would lead to allowing one party or the other, to eviscerate the court's proposed decree in this matter, 
and allow one party or the other to gain an unfair advantage or control over the other in post decree 
5 
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disagreements, which the court finds are likely to arise. 
(10) The court finds that Oletta Cummings served as a corporate officer in the corporation, 
and was only recently, and after the commencement of these divorce proceedings, removed as a 
corporate officer by the Defendant. The court further finds that the removal of Oletta Cummings as 
an officer and member of the board of said corporation was not with proper notice and violated other 
corporate law formalities. The court further finds that all appointments of others as officers and 
directors of C. Kay Cummings Candy to have been without proper notice to the Plaintiff and in 
violation of corporate law. 
(11) The court makes these findings for purposes of allowing the Plaintiff to protect her 
interests in the corporate assets which the court intends to give her as part of the Decree in this 
matter. The court further finds that should these steps be inadequate to give both parties equal power 
and authority over corporate assets further post Decree of Divorce steps may need to be taken. The 
court further finds that the parties are each one-half owners of all the stock of C. Kay Cummings 
Candy, Inc. 
(12) The court finds that the business, which originally was commenced by the parties in 
Sugar House, grew and that in approximately 1984, the parties purchased land located at 2057 East 
3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. The court further finds that the parties later, through an industrial 
revenue bond, obtained a loan and built a building on the land located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and that they subsequently moved the C. Kay Cummings Candy business into that 
building. 
(13) The court finds that the building, the land, and all the equipment, and assets, have 
been appraised by a court ordered appraiser, one David Posey, who is an accountant, who has relied 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
on sub-appraisers as to the value of the real estate. The building has been appraised as being worth 
$587,748.00 and the land as being worth $105,000.00. The court further finds that these values are 
in some question but that neither party has objected thereto. On the other hand, the court finds that 
neither party agrees that $397,000.00 is the earning capacity of the business. This matter of the 
value of the business itself has been appealed by the Defendant and the question has been remanded 
to this court for further consideration. The court has elected to take evidence on the issue, and an 
evidentiary hearing was held on August 11, 1997, and again on September 22, 1997. 
A. At said hearing, the Court received the testimony of the witness David Posey, 
a Certified Public Accountant, who was previously appointed by the Court to do an 
appraisal of the subject business. Mr. Posey was called and sworn. Mr. Posey was 
examined and cross examined by counsel at some length. Mr. Posey identified 
Defendant's exhibits 1, 2, and 3, and the same were admitted in evidence. 
B. The court finds that David Posey is an independent Certified Public 
| Accountant, and is not an employee of the Defendant, nor does the witness share any 
j interest in the outcome of these proceedings. 
C. The Court finds that the evaluation of the business by the Court appointed 
expert included consideration of the value of any good will of the business. The 
Court also finds that the valuation given by David Posey is based on unaudited 
factual data reported to him by Mr. Cummings. The court further finds that the 
appraisal done by Mr. Posey was based on generally accepted business accounting 
practices used in evaluating businesses. 
D. The court finds that the value of the business without the building or the real 
7 
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estate at the time of the divorce, was $481,816.00. The court further finds that this 
amount takes into account previously taxed but undistributed income, and that 
paragraph #21 of its previous Findings should be deleted. 
(14) The court finds that the real estate on which the candy company building is built and 
where the business is transacted is in the name of the parties as joint tenants and always has been. 
The court further finds that the parties have leased that land to the business over the years, and that 
at one time they had a written lease agreement. Said land lease agreement provided that each of the 
parties would be paid $500.00 per month. The court further finds that in recent years, the parties 
have orally agreed to a land lease payment from the business to them personally at $1,500.00 each 
per month ($3,000.00 per month total). The court makes no finding as to what the fair lease value 
of the land and/or building to the business is, but finds that by the course of conduct, $1,500.00 each 
per month from C. Kay Cummings, Inc. to the Plaintiff and Defendant has become the agreement 
of the parties. 
(15) The court finds that during the course of the litigation in this case which extended 
originally over a period of approximately two and one-half years, (and by the time the Court heard 
the matter on remand nearly five years), the Defendant has totally controlled the business, C. Kay 
Cummings Candy, Inc. The court further finds that C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. is currently 
behind in its land lease obligation to Oletta Cummings for the months of September 1992 through 
December 1992, January 1993 through December 1993, January 1994 through May 1994, and 
December 1994 through September 1995, for a total arrearage spanning twenty-four (24) months and 
a total arrearage in the amount of $36,000.00. 
(16) The court further finds that the Defendant was ordered to pay Oletta Cummings 
8 
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$ 1,663.00 per month as and for temporary alimony early in these proceedings. This has been the 
order of the court for a period of approximately two and one-half years. The court further finds that 
the Defendant has tried during the divorce proceedings to get credit against his monthly temporary 
alimony obligation by sending checks to the Plaintiff marked land lease payment, and not sending 
a separate alimony check to her in the $1,663.00 per month amount. The court further finds that the 
Plaintiff has obtained on two separate occasions judgments against the Defendant including 
attorney's fees arrearages in the alimony obligation and that the court on two prior occasions found 
that the temporary alimony obligation, and the land lease obligation of the Defendant to the Plaintiff 
are separate obligations, and that the Defendant is not entitled to credit for one against the other. 
(17) The court finds that the parties discussed the idea of a Family Trust in 1984 when 
candy business was incorporated. The court further finds that the notion of a family trust was 
referred to in some of the documents surrounding the financing of the building and that the parties 
signed a stock certificate at the time the business was incorporated which purported to transfer the 
stock of the corporation to a family trust. The court finds however, that no trust existed at the time 
of that transfer and that therefore the purported stock transfer was null and of no effect. The court 
further finds that at the time the stock transfer document was executed by the parties, it was 
anticipated that a subsequent family trust which was yet to be formed, would contain provisions 
jointly agreed on by the parties. The Court finds that there was no subsequent agreement or 
formation of a joint trust. The court further finds that the Defendant, by himself, subsequent to the 
incorporation and the document purporting the transfer of each of the parties corporate stock to a 
trust, created his own trust. The court finds that the Defendant could not or did not obtain the 
signature of his wife on that trust agreement. The court further finds that the Defendant then 
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attempted to create a (rust by himself by being the sole trustor and trustee. The court also finds that 
although the Defendant had the power to create and fund a trust by himself, he did not by himself 
have the power to put his wife's share of marital assets into his own personal trust. 
(18) The court further finds that it must make findings with regard to the validity of the 
purported Cummings Family Trust referred to immediately above in that the Defendant has, since 
a relatively early time in these proceedings, maintained that a family trust exists, and that much of 
the marital property of the parties is in that trust, and that it is therefore outside the reach of the court. 
The court further finds that in the fall of 1993, while this divorce was pending, and after nine years 
of ignoring the claimed trust, the Defendant unilaterally and without notice to anyone, after nine 
years of being the sole "trustee" of the "trust," attempted appoint two co-trustees, had trust letterhead 
printed, and opened a trust account. All of these activities were the first interest shown by the 
Defendant in the trust that the Defendant in nine years time, and only after the divorce action was 
commenced. The court further finds that in the fall of 1993, when this divorce had been pending for 
approximately one year, the Defendant then had his purported newly appointed co-trustees file an 
action through separate counsel to try and intervene in this divorce action to protect the assets of the 
so called trust. The court notes that this matter of intervention was heard first by the court's 
commissioner for domestic matters, Michael S. Evans, and that pursuant to the rules concerning 
intervention, the Commissioner made a recommendation that the trustees not be allowed to 
intervene. That recommendation was appealed to this court and subsequently sustained. In so doing 
the court then found and now finds that the Defendant, as the original trustee, and a continuing 
"trustee" under the Defendant's alleged trust, could adequately represent the interest of the trust in 
the divorce litigation, reserving to the Defendant the right to call his alleged co-trustees, or other 
10 
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witnesses at the time of trial. The court further finds that the Defendant had no bank account of any 
kind for the trust for approximately nine years from 1984 to 1993. That there was no trust letterhead, 
and that no trust business was conducted. That the trust filed no tax returns until 1993 when the 
Defendant began to realize the weakness of his trust claim, at which time he opened trust account, 
had letterhead printed, and began to file trust returns. 
(19) The court further finds that the Defendant, established or attempted to establish another 
trust like entity in the late 1980fs or early 1990's, giving a new trustee, namely one Frank Pond 
Reese, control over aspects and assets of the candy company, which the Defendant has claimed were 
transferred earlier into the 1984 trust. That the court finds this behavior is inconsistent with the 
notion that the 1984 trust ever existed, even in the mind of the Defendant. The court finds that no 
other non-business related, non-marital assets, were ever put into the "trust." The court finds that 
the Cummings Family Trust docs not now exist, specifically that the trust that the Defendant 
purported to try and establish by himself in 1984 never existed, and that none of the assets of the 
candy company or the parties are now, or ever were, transferred from the control of the shareholders, 
or owners of C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. The court further finds that each of the parties hereto 
each own one-half of the C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. stock and that they each own personally 
one-half of the land, building, and business located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
which serves as the premises of the Candy Company. 
(20) The court further finds that each of the parties personally own one-half of all other 
assets of the C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. including investment accounts, bank accounts, motor 
vehicles, equipment, stock, materials, accounts receivable and contracts, and any other property of 
any description wheresoever situated located at the 33rd South location or at the foothill store. 
11 
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(21) The court linds that the parties acquired a home and real estate during the marriage 
located at 1134 11.1 Icrbcrl Ave, Salt Lake City, Utah, which is currently paid for. The court further 
finds that said home and real estate is worth approximately $127,000.00. Further, the court finds that 
said home was purchased by the parties from the Plaintiffs parents on favorable terms due to the 
relationship existing between the Plaintiff, Defendant, and the Plaintiffs parents. 
(22) The court further finds that the parties have been separated for more than two years, 
and that the Plaintiff has resided in the home since the date of the parties separation. The court finds 
that the parties have largely divided between them the personal property that was located in the 
house in a manner which should be confirmed by the court, awarding to each of the parties those 
items of personal property currently in their possession as their sole and separate property, free and 
clear of any claim of the other party subject only to exceptions which are otherwise specified herein. 
(23) The court finds that the coin collection (silver coins) and the stamp collection, have 
values of $422.00 and $1,129.80, respectively and that these should be awarded to the Defendant 
who collected them. 
(24) The court finds that the art work (paintings) of the parties have a value of $8,194.00 
and should be awarded to Plaintiff. 
(25) The court finds that the parties should each be awarded one-half of all stocks, bonds, 
and other investments acquired during the course of the marriage by the parties or either of them 
currently held or administered by Smith Barney, or First Western Financial Advisors, or elsewhere 
regardless of the name the account may be in. These accounts currently have total market value of 
$237,918.00 and each of the parties should be awarded $118,959.00 worth. The court finds that the 
known investments may be described as and have the values as listed on Exhibit C attached hereto. 
i 12 
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(26) The court further finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded the 1993 Oldsmobile as 
her sole and separate property free and clear of any claim of the Defendant. 
(27) The court further finds that each of the parties should be awarded approximately one-
half of all other personal property acquired during the course of the marriage not otherwise herein 
provided for. 
(28) The court finds that determining the Defendant's income is problematic. The 
business, C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., has had gross sales in 1992 and 1993 of $1,125,388.00 and 
i!$l,281,404.00 respectively. Although the Cummings personal tax returns show joint income of 
$151,064.00 and $205,760.00 for 1992 and 1993, the Defendant has chosen for the parties to live 
austerely, and has during the last two years of the divorce, while this divorce has been pending 
chosen to live in a small office at the candy store and to shower at a local gymnasium. In doing this, 
the Defendant has chosen for the parties, instead of taking income, to plow both parties share of the 
income back into the business as previously taxed and retained income as referred to in paragraph 
twenty-one above. 
(29) The court finds that the Defendant's stated income at the time of deposition was 
unusually low. The court finds that this stated salary is artificially low, and is not reasonably or 
realistically connected to the amount of money that the Defendant could or would but for these 
divorce proceedings, be taking out of the business income. The court further finds that determining 
income for support purposes may be different than for IRS purposes {Utah Code Anno. §7-45-7.5). 
The court further finds that a reasonable amount to attribute to the Defendant as income, including 
a salary from the business without putting the cash flow and needs of the business at risk is $160,000 
per year or $13,330.00 per month gross. The court makes this finding based on the testimony of 
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Stephen F. Petersen who reviewed the tax returns of the business for 1992 and 1993, and the parties 
for 1992 and 1993. 
(30) The court further finds that this finding in paragraph thirty immediately above is 
unnecessarily difficult to make because the Defendant has refused to participate in the discovery 
process in ways and to an extent which is documented elsewhere in the file and which ultimately led 
to his answer being stricken and his default entered. 
(31) The court further finds that the Defendant has provided little information over the two 
and one-half year span of this case concerning his expenses. What little information the court does 
have was provided early in the divorce process during a time when the Defendant was living at the 
candy store, apparently the Defendant has continued to live at the candy store during these divorce 
[proceedings, obtaining his meals commercially, and showering at a local gymnasium. The court 
finds that the Defendant cannot reasonably continue to live at the candy store, buy all his meals 
commercially, and shower at a gymnasium, and that he will ultimately choose, post decree of 
divorce, to live under less than such austere circumstances, and with no other information available 
from him but his original declaration of expenses on file, that his monthly expenses are, or will 
reasonably be, $ 1,500.00 per month. 
(32) The court finds that the Plaintiff is employable but all her experience is at the candy 
company where she has developed experience in all phases of the candy business over a period of 
thirty plus years, the court finds that the Plaintiff at age sixty-four is not likely to be retrained in 
another field or find a job that will pay her more than near minimum wage. 
(33) The court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to both the $1,500.00 per month land lease 
payment for her one-half share of the real estate on which the business is located, and alimony in the 
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amount of $ 1,663.00 per month which has been the temporary order of the court for two and one-half 
years. In making this finding the court notes that both parties need for support has contracted to 
meet the money available based on the Defendant's unilateral decision to put the parties in an 
austerity mode during these divorce proceedings. That the Defendant has been under court order to 
pay $1,663.00 per month in alimony and under a contractual obligation to pay $1,500.00 per month 
additionally in land lease payments. The court further specifically finds that the $3,000.00 a month 
that the business has been paying for the land, ($1,500.00 to each party) is not the fair monthly lease 
or rental value of the land and building, and that the fair monthly lease value of the land and building 
as of April 13, 1998, was the amount of $7,414.00 per month triple net, meaning with the lessee or 
tenant paying this amount plus all taxes and insurance on the building, etc. 
(34) The court further finds that the Plaintiff is unemployed She has historically had 
expenses of $1,663.00 per month during these proceedings. The court finds that it is difficult to set 
an appropriate alimony amount in this case because of the Defendant's failure to participate in the 
discovery process. The court notes that in making this alimony finding that the Defendant argued 
on more than one occasion that his temporary alimony obligation should be lowered but in each 
instance the temporary alimony of $1,663.00 was upheld. The Defendant, with some prodding, has 
paid this amount for two and one-half years. The court finds that Mrs. Cummings is entitled to 
receive, on a permanent basis, $1,663.00 per month as alimony and the income she will receive from 
the ownership of the land and building, which the court intends to award her as her one-half of share 
of the marital assets. The court further finds that C. Kay Cummings can, and has had in the past, the 
power to pay said alimony and to make sure that C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. pays Oletta 
Cummings a lease payment on the building and real estate, and that said lease payment should be 
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in an amount equal to 75% of the fair market lease value. The court finds the fair market lease value 
to be $7,414.00 per month. The Defendant should be ordered to pay or cause to be paid to the 
Plaintiff 75% of said fair market value per month, or the amount of $5,560.00, commencing on the 
1st day of May, 1998. 
(35) The court finds that the best thing for both parties would be to preserve the business, 
C. Kay Cummings Candy, as an ongoing concern operated by the Defendant. A sale of the business 
assets is not an attractive alternative because the income producing capacity and blue sky of the 
business is closely tied to the Defendant operating the business himself, and because of the specialty 
nature of the business. 
(36) With an eye to dividing the marital assets of the parties in a way which would allow 
the business to continue in operation and which is most nearly an equitable and 50/50 division, the 
I court finds a division of the marital assets should be awarded as follows: 
TO THE PLAINTIFF: 
a. The home and real estate located at 1134 Herbert Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah, 
in align with the value; Value: $127,000.00 
b. A 75% interest in the ground located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, which is the real estate on which the business building is located and the business is operated; 
Value: $78,750.00 
c. A 75% interest in the building located at 2057 East 3300 South on the above 
I described land on which the business is located; 
Value: $440,811.00 
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d. One half of the Smith Barney and First Western Advisors investment accounts 
with values totaling $227,918.00, or $113,959.00 to her. 
e. All personal property currently located in the home and real estate at 1134 
Herbert Avenue, including the jewelry in the Defendant's possession (the collateral), with the 
exception of the stamp collection and coin collection. 
Estimated value at the time of hearing: $ 25,000.00 
TOTAL TO PLAINTIFF $785,520.00 
TO THE DEFENDANT: 
a. All of the equipment, materials, stock, accounts receivable, and other personal 
property of C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., including Blue Sky, the van, and the ongoing right to 
operate the business in the name of C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. plus the previously taxed income 
retained by the business. 
Business Value: (without real estate) $481,816.00 
b. All the Defendant's clothing and personal effects and personal property 
currently in his possession including the stamp and coin collections; but not the jewelry referred to 
above; Value: $ 5,000.00 
c. One half of Smith Barney and First Western Advisors stock and retirement 
accounts; Value: $113,959.00 
d. A 25% interest in the real estate and building located at 2057 East 3300 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Value: $178,187.00 
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TOTAL TO DEFENDANT: $778,962.00 
(37) The court further finds that the business C. Kay Cummings Candy has in addition to 
paying the $1,500.00 per month to each party as a land lease payment, been making the payment to 
Helen Rappaport and Alan S. Cohen for the financing on the land and/or building (which had a 
balance owing on March 17, 1998 or $321,684.00). The court finds that the Defendant should 
assume and pay debt on the land and building as his sole and separate debt, and hold the Plaintiff 
harmless thereon. 
(38) The court finds each of the parties should execute all documents needed to carry out 
the intent of these findings and decree based thereon 
I (39) The court finds that the plaintiff has asked the court for and received from the court 
prior judgments for temporary attorney's fees, which have been paid by the Defendant. The court 
further finds that in addition to the fees which have been previously awarded and paid, the Plaintiff 
has reasonably incurred the sum of $2,920.00 in additional attorney's and paralegal fees, and $300.00 
in additional costs of court for professional witnesses who testified at the time of the default hearing, 
namely Stephen F. Petersen. 
Having published the above findings of fact the court now makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(1) The Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce dissolving the bonds of 
matrimony previously existing between the parties. The same to become final upon the signing and 
entry thereof. 
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(2) The Decree of Divorce should adopt and be congruent with the Findings of Fact 
outlined above. 
(3) The trust the Defendant attempted to create in 1984 does not now exist, never existed, 
and was never funded with marital assets or otherwise. 
(4) Oletta Cummings is the Vice President and a member of the Board of Directors of 
C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., having never been removed from those offices. 
DATED t h i s / * / day of / ( //J , 1998. 
BY THE COURT 
HONORABLE JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law Upon Remand to the following, postage prepaid this .=2(5^ 
Day of \jA(UAf , 1998: 
M. Byron Fisher 
FABIAN & CLENDEN1N 
215 South State, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
C&li 51 Sally Hutchings 
D:\WP61 \CLIENTS\CUMMINGS\FIND-F ACT.REM 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Oletta Cummings, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Clyde Kay Cummings, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FILED 
DEC I 9 1996 
COURT OF APPEALS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 950504-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 19, 1996) 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, Division I 
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Attorneys: M. Byron Fisher and James F. Wood, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
David A. McPhie, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Wilkins. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Appellant appeals the trial court's orders striking his 
answer, entering default judgment, and dividing the marital 
estate in response to his long-term failure to comply with court 
orders pertaining to discovery and other matters. The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in striking defendant's answer 
and entering his default given his repeated failure to cooperate. 
Marshall v. MarsliaJJL, 915 P.2d 508, 515 (Utah App.
 # 1996) . The 
other issues raised by appellant are likewise within the 
discretion of the trial court, wjth the possible, exception of the 
treatment of. Jihe_r_etained earnings in valuing the business, ancT 
the valuation of the business itself. """"* 
Valuation and division of marital property will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion, and as long as they are 
supported by adequate factual findings to reveal the basis for 
the trial court's conclusions. Rappleye v. Rappleye. 855 P.2d 
260, 263 (Utah App. 1993). In this case, the findings of fact do 
not sufficiently explain the court's "equitable and 50/50 
division'1 of the marital property in that the findings fail to 
address how much, if any, of the previously-taxed retained 
earnings that were awarded to defendant may have also been 
included in the value of the business. It is unclear whether, in 
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deciding th i s issue, the t r i a l court ac tua l ly considered the 
report of the court-appointed expert . The findings a lso lack 
suf f ic ien t d e t a i l as to how the court arr ived at i t s va lua t ion of 
the business . See id. 
We_a£firtn inj^a^^JbuJLJcema f i n d i n g s o f 
f ac_t__p_a t^he -aForernentJLoxiedLls.sues. XhiZfctoal..courj: jnayT hajs e "jLts 
findings on the evidence _naw„irL. the record, . or i t may.jwish-to " 
talce" addi t ional evidence. 
^'/ 
tr r 
Russeil W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Morman H. Jackson, Judge 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
^* 
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DAVID A. MelMIII'(2216) 
Attorney at Law 
2105 E. Murray-Holladay Rd. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
(801)278-3700 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
| IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
OLETTA CUMMINGS, : ORDER ESTABLISHING FAIR 
: MARKET LEASE VALUE 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
: Civil No. 924903713 DA 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS, : 
: Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Defendant. : 
—ooOoo— 
THE MATTER of the Plaintiffs Motion to Establish the Fair Market Lease Value of the 
building located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki in his courtroom located at 450 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on Monday the 13th day of April, 1998, at the hour of 2:00 o'clock p.m. 
I The matter was set for an evidentiary hearing. The Plaintiff appeared personally, and was 
represented by her attorney of record David A. McPhie. The Defendant appeared personally and 
was represented by his attorney of record M. Byron Fisher. 
The Court received sworn testimony from the witnesses C. Kay Cummings, and David 
Posey, C.P.A., who were examined and cross examined by counsel, along with a stipulation of 
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the parlies that the fair market lease value of the subject real estate, that is the building located at 
2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, is $7,414.00 per month, triple net. The parties 
informed the Court that they had reached the stipulation based on the fact that the Plaintiffs 
appraiser one Kerry Jorgensen, had appraised the property as having a fair market monthly lease 
value of $7,644.00 per month triple net, and the Defendant's appraiser, one Paul W. Thronson, 
had appraised the property of having a fair monthly lease market value of $7,185.00 per month 
triple net. The parties, through counsel, stipulated that they had agreed to split the difference. 
I The Court considered the argument of counsel and the evidence, and the file. The Court 
noted that the Decree of Divorce in this matter specifically provides in paragraph 9 thereof as 
follows; 
"The Defendant is ordered to pay or, to cause to be paid to the Plaintiff, by C. Kay 
Cummings, Inc., the sum of $3,000.00 per month s ongoing rent or lease payment 
on the property and building located at 2057 East 3300 South, until such time as 
the fair monthly leasehold value of the land and building can be agreed upon or 
established by court order." 
The Court notes that this court has formerly ruled as is outlined in the transcript from the 
hearing dated November 19, 1997, that the issue of the Defendant's obligation to both pay the 
underlying mortgage obligation on the property, and a fair lease payment on the property to the 
owner thereof is a "dead issue". Having considered all of the above, the court now makes the 
following: 
ORDER 
L The Court finds and determines that the fair market lease value of the subject real 
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estate located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, is the amount stipulated to by the 
parties, that is $7,414.00 per month triple net, meaning with the tenant paying all the taxes and 
insurance, etc., on the property in addition to this monthly figure. 
2. The Court has previously determined as part of its hearing on remand in this 
matter, that the Defendant should be awarded a one quarter (1/4) interest in the subject building 
and real estate, therefore, it is not fair that he pay 100% of the fair lease value of the property to 
his former wife, but rather that he should pay 75% thereof. 
3. Effective May 1, 1998, the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff 3/4 of the fair 
market leave value of the building and real estate per month as a lease payment, that is the sum 
of $5,560.00 per month. This shall be a triple net monthly obligation with the Defendant also 
responsible to pay all of the taxes and insurance, etc., on the building during the period of his 
occupancy. 
4. The Court notes that the Defendant has stated in open court his intention to vacate 
the subject premises rather than remain in the premises under this new higher lease obligation. It 
is the order of the Court that should the Defendant remain in the premises, that he execute a lease 
agreement with the Plaintiff bearing standard terms, and providing for a $5,560.00 per month 
triple net lease payment to the Plaintiff. 
5. Should the Defendant not sign a lease, or not pay the new lease payment, or fail to 
vacate the subject premises within a reasonable period of time, the Plaintiff may bring this matter 
back before the Court for an eviction order. 
6. Each of the parties is ordered to bear their own costs of court and attorney's fees 
incurred in bringing and maintaining their respective positions with regard to this Motion. 
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DAI HI) (his clay of , 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Establishing 
Fair Market Lease Value to the following, postage prepaid this £$_; Day of 
\MoiA~- , 1998: 
M. Byron Fisher 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street, Suite 1200 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Sally I l u t c h i n e s 0 
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SMITH BARNEY INC. 
ACCOUNT #: 508-14165 
FC: LARRY BRADSHAW 
ACCOUNT POSITION SUMMARY 
AS OF 02/07/95 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS AND 
OLETTA W. CUMMINGS JT TEN WROS 
1134 HERBERT AVENUE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105-1511 
UNPRICED SECURITIES 
MONEY FUNDS 
FIXED INCOME 
MUTUAL FUNDS 
INS/ANN 
ACCOUNT VALUE* 
10,233.66 
16,047.55 
14,115.31 
11,756.60 
52,153.12 
(&.* VALUE DOES NOT INCLUDE UNPRICED SECURITIES. . ,,,v,v..».,->•>.,*+ , 
IfeTHIS INFORMATION IS BEING PROVIDED AT YOUR REQUEST AND DOES NOT REPLACE OR SUPERSEDE YOUR SMITH BARNEY INC. CUSTOMER ' ^ 
^STATEMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS BASED UPON THE MARKET VALUE OF YOUR ACCOUNT AS OF THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS AND IS SUBJECT > 
.'•- • •;••••.•. .,->."'••••->'•,. .-.-••• -•: f ' i - ••••• s - ^ v ^ y ^ ' £ & & r \ . ; r K 
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SMITH BARNEY INC. PAGE 1 
ACCOUNT #: 50 8-14165 
FC: LARRY BRADSHAW 
ACCOUNT POSITIONS 
AS OF 02/07/95 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS AND 
OLETTA W. CUMMINGS JT TEN WROS 
1134 HERBERT AVENUE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105-1511 
QUANTITY SECURITY DESCRIPTION 
10,199 
10,000 
929 
10,000 
5,000 
SMITH BARNEY MONEY FUNDS INC 
34.50 ACCRUED DIVIDED 
LIFE INS COMP. OF VIRGINIA 
S3 MANAGED MUNI FD CL A 
28.84 ACCRUED DIVIDED 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH ARPT REV 
FGIC INSD-AMT-REG DTD 4/1/8 9 
7.875 12/01/1997 P/R@ 102.00 
795576CK10R0 12/01/2018 MAT 
1. 
1, 
15. 
108, 
PRICE 
.000 
,175 
.150 
.598 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH ARPT REV 
-REG- FGIC INSD -AMT-
DTD 3/1/9 0 CALLABLE 
7.25 07/01/2020 
1 0 3 . 7 5 5 
MARKET VA 
$ 1 0 , 2 3 3 . 6 6 
$ 1 1 , 7 5 6 . 6 0 
$ 1 4 , 0 8 6 . 4 7 
$ 1 0 , 8 5 9 . 8 0 
$ 5 , 1 8 7 . 7 5 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE* $52,124.28 
• V A L U E D O E S N O T I N C L U D E U N P R I C E D S E C U R I T I E S . 
T H I S I N F O R M A T I O N IS B E I N G P R O V I D E D A T Y O U R R E Q U E S T A N D DOES N O T R E P L A C E OR S U P E R S E D E Y O U R SMTTH B A R N E Y I N C . C U S T O M E R 
S T A T E M E N T . T H I S I N F O R M A T I O N IS B A S E D U P O N T H E M A R K E T V A L U E OF Y O U R A C C O U N T AS O F T H E C L O S E O F B U S I N E S S A N D IS SUBJECT 
T O DAILY M A R K E T F L U C T U A T I O N . 
.••^•'-••'.•.i^v.^rf' "!<• • ^ >** j^.* ;^ NipLv|i6.^ ; ;^V»if;":^  ?5i^ «*iH2si. ^ y^^i^c-^-jS- ;-"-*"i*=*-.?. "•>« ^  •  • 
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SMITH BARNEY INC. 
ACCOUNT #: 508-64352 
FC: LARRY BRADSHAW 
ACCOUNT POSITION SUMMARY 
AS OF 02/07/95 
*** CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS 
SMITH BARNEY INC ROLLOVER CUST 
2057 EAST 3300 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84109-2630 
MONEY FUNDS 
STOCKS 
FIXED INCOME 
MUTUAL FUNDS 
UNIT TRUSTS 
ACCOUNT VALUE* 
1,714.42 
17,281.25 
9,950.00 
43,005.09 
17,743.49 
89,694.25 
„,• VAJLUE DOES NOT INCLUDE UNPRICED SECURITIES. 
tTHlS INFORMATION IS BEING PROVIDED AT YOUR REQUEST AND DOES NOT REPLACE OR SUPERSEDE YOUR SMITH BARNEY INC. CUSTOMER 
STATEMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS BASED UPON THE MARKET VALUE OF YOUR ACCOUNT AS OF THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS AND IS SUBJECT 
TO DAIT V MADircT ci ttr-Ttr«nnn 
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SMITH BARNEY INC. PAGE 1 
ACCOUNT #: 5 0 8 - 6 4 3 5 2 
FC: LARRY BRADSHAW 
ACCOUNT POSITIONS 
AS OF 0 2 / 0 7 / 9 5 
*** CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS 
SMITH BARNEY INC ROLLOVER CUST 
2057 EAST 3300 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4 1 0 9 - 2 6 3 0 
QUANTITY SECURITY DESCRIPTION 
1,708 
PRICE 
SMITH BARNEY MONEY FUNDS INC 1.000 
5.7 4 ACCRUED DIVIDED 
18,977 UNITS EQUITY INCOME FD CONCEPT .935 
TELE-GLOBAL TR SER 2 QRTLY PMT 
4,066 FRANKLIN CUST FD INCOME SER 2.120 
1,317 G T GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 15.090 
350 MCDONALDS CORP 33.375 
200 QUESTAR CORP 28.000 
1,924 SB FUNDAMENTAL VALUE CL B 7.190 
EST FREE $ A/O 02/06 $1,627 
EST CDSC MAX CHARGE $3 65 
49 SB UTILITIES CL B 13.480 
EST FREE $ A/O 02/06 $89 
EST CDSC MAX CHARGE $17 
1.23 ACCRUED DIVIDED 
10,000 STANDARD CREDIT CARD TR 1990-4 99.500 
CL A PART CTF-DTD 5/2/1990-BK 
ENTRY-FINAL MTY OF 7/10/1996 
9.15 05/10/1995 
MARKET V 
$ 1 , 7 1 4 . 4 2 
$ 1 7 , 7 4 3 . 4 9 
$8,620.22 
$19,886.80 
$11,681.25 
$ 5 , 6 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 1 3 , 8 3 3 . 7 3 
$ 6 6 3 . 1 1 
$ 9 , 9 5 0 . 0 0 
** MORE ** 
*^$$^x&* ^mmkii 
• > . ^ P - ^ . ' A % - ; « I ^ 
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SMITH BARNEY INC. PAGE 2 
ACCOUNT # : 5 0 8 - 6 4 3 5 2 
FC: LARRY BRADSHAW 
ACCOUNT POSITIONS 
AS OF 0 2 / 0 7 / 9 5 
*** CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS 
QUANTITY SECURITY DESCRIPTION PRICE MARKET VA 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE* $ 8 9 , 6 9 3 . 0 2 
* VALUE DOES NOT INCLUDE UNPRICED SECURITIES. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BEING PROVIDED AT YOUR REQUEST AND DOES NOT REPLACE OR SUPERSEDE YOUR SMrTH BARNEY INC. CUSTOMER 
STATEMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS BASED UPON THE MARKET VALUE OF YOUR ACCOUNT AS OF THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS AND IS SUBJECT 
TO DAILY MARKET FLUCTUATION. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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SMITH BARNEY INC. 
ACCOUNT #: 5 0 8 - 2 5 6 8 6 
FC: LARRY BRADSHAW 
ACCOUNT POSITION SUMMARY 
AS OF 0 2 / 0 7 / 9 5 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS TTEE 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS FAMILY TR 
D/T/D 1 2 / 1 4 / 8 4 
2057 E 3300 S 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4 1 0 9 - 2 6 3 0 
CASH ACCT 3AL 
FIXED INCOME 
ACCOUNT VALUE* 
1 2 7 . 0 8 
4 , 7 2 1 . 8 0 
4 , 8 4 8 . 8 8 
• VALUE DOES NOT INCLUDE UNPRICED SECURmES. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BEING PROVIDED AT YOUR REQUEST AND DOES NOT REPLACE OR SUPERSEDE YOUR SMITH BARNEY INC. CUSTOMER 
: STATEMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS BASED UPON THE MARKET VALUE OFYOUR ACCOUNT ASOF THE CLOSEOF BUSINESS AND IS SUBJECT, 
. nirtr-r Cf t l rTMATtnM 
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SMITH BARNEY INC. PAGE 1 
ACCOUNT # : 5 0 8 - 2 5 6 8 6 
FC: LARRY BRADSHAW 
ACCOUNT POSITIONS 
AS OF 0 2 / 0 7 / 9 5 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS TTEE 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS FAMILY TR 
D/T/D 1 2 / 1 4 / 8 4 . 
2057 E 3300 S 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4 1 0 9 - 2 6 3 0 
QUANTITY SECURITY DESCRIPTION 
5 , 0 0 0 CLARK CNTY NEV IMPT TRANSN 
G/O LT MBIA INSD SER C BK ENT 
OID-DTD 7 / 1 / 9 4 F/C 1 2 / 1 / 9 4 
6 . 1 0 0 6 / 0 1 / 2 0 1 5 
PRICE 
9 4 . 4 3 6 
MARKET VA 
$ 4 , 7 2 1 . 8 0 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE* $ 4 , 7 2 1 . 8 0 
• VALUE DOES NOT INCLUDE UNPRICED SECURmES. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BEING PROVIDED AT YOUR REQUEST AND DOES NOT REPLACE OR SUPERSEDE YOUR SMITH BARNEY INC. CUSTOMER 
STATEMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS BASED UPON THE MARKET VALUE OF YOUR ACCOUNT AS OF THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS AND IS SUBJECT 
TO DAILY MARKET FLUCTUATION. 
- • > • • > i . * * * * . » • - : 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SMITH BARNEY INC. 
ACCOUNT #: 5 0 8 - 1 4 4 5 6 
FC: LARRY BRADSHAW 
ACCOUNT POSITION SUMMARY 
AS OF 0 2 / 0 7 / 9 5 
***OLETTA W. CUMMINGS 
SMITH BARNEY INC IRA CUSTODIAN 
1134 HERBERT AVENUEH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105 
MONEY FUNDS 
STOCKS 
FIXED INCOME 
MUTUAL FUNDS 
ACCOUNT VALUE* 
2 2 . 3 7 
3 , 8 7 5 . 0 0 
9 , 9 2 1 . 2 8 
3 , 0 5 5 . 6 7 
1 6 , 8 7 4 . 3 2 
* VALUE DOES NOT INCLUDE UNPRICED SECURITIES. - . , , , • . . - , . . . , , _ , . . ..,...••... ......,.M,._.;,....,..,.»,........-."...,, 
• j ' THIS INFORMATION IS BEING PROVIDED AT YOUR REQUEST AND DOES NOT REPLACE OR .SUPERSEDE YOUR SMITH BARNEY JNC. CUSTOMER ^ 
•*fT?*jff?vrr f t r t e ixrrnoUATTnM tCDA c n n f TPnisi T H P MAPKPT VALUE OF YOUR ACCOUNT AS OF THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS AND IS SUBJECT 
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ACCOUNT #: 508-14456 
FC: LARRY BRADSHAW 
SMITH BARNEY INC. PAGE 1 
ACCOUNT POSITIONS 
AS OF 0 2 / 0 7 / 9 5 
***OLETTA W. CUMMINGS 
SMITH BARNEY INC IRA CUSTODIAN 
1134 HERBERT AVENUEH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105 
QUAiNTITY SECURITY DESCRIPTION 
22 SMITH BARNEY MONEY FUNDS INC 
.02 ACCRUED DIVIDED 
1,441 FRANKLIN CUST FD INCOME SER 
200 PACIFICORP 
4,000 STRIPS-TINT-U S TREASURY 
0000 11/15/1996 
4,000 STRIPS-TINT-U S TREASURY 
0000 08/15/1997 
4,000 STRIPS-TINT-U S TREASURY 
0000 11/15/1998 
PRICE 
1 . 0 0 0 
2 . 1 2 0 
1 9 . 3 7 5 
8 8 . 4 6 9 
8 3 . 5 63 
7 6 . 0 0 0 
MARKET V; 
$ 2 2 . 3 7 
$ 3 , 0 5 5 . 6 7 
$ 3 , 8 7 5 . 0 0 
$ 3 , 5 3 8 . 7 6 
$ 3 , 3 4 2 . 5 2 
$ 3 , 0 4 0 . 0 0 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE* $16f874.32 
• VALUE DOES NOT INCLUDE UNPRICED SECURITIES. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BEING PROVIDED AT YOUR REQUEST AND DOES NOT REPLACE OR SUPERSEDE YOUR SMITH BARNEY INC. CUSTOMER 
STATEMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS BASED UPON THE MARKET VALUE OF YOUR ACCOUNT AS OF THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS AND IS SUBJECT 
TO DAILY MARKET FLUCTUATION. 
3KS*M 
$ « $ ^ '. •.**•! *&:'V"* 
^
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' •# .. '. 82-08-lS9b'"02!55PM FIRST WESTERN flDUISORS 1^15213539 P. 02 
02/08/1995 DAVID A. RUSSON 
FIRST WESTERN ADVISORS Cash Flow Analysis V.P* INVESTMENTS 
PORTFOLIO OWNER: Cuinmings, K« (IRA) 
ACCOUNT NUMBER: 0775654 
Security 
Description 
MAINSTAY TOTAL RETrN 
PHOENIX GROWTH FUND 
PORTFOLIO TOTALS: 
Quantity 
214.172 
210.275 
$ 
Value 
3,283.26 
4,283.30 
7,566.56$ 
Cash 
Flow 
80.74 
65.19 
145.93 
Yield 
2.5% 
1.5% 
1.9% 
% of 
Holdings 
43.4% 
55.6% 
100.0% 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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02-08-195 : 2' 56PM FIRST WESTERN ADUISORS 3213539 P. 03 
»=rrr»=iss=5=5sse 
0 2 / 0 8 / 1 9 9 5 
FIRST WESTERN ADVISORS Cash Flow A n a l y s i s 
DAVID A. RUSSON 
V . P . INVESTMENTS 
PORTFOLIO CVJHER: Cunnning3, 0 . (IRA) 
ACCOUNT NUI4BER: 0455125 
Security 
Description Quantity Value 
Cash 
Flow 
% of 
Yield Holdings 
MAINSTAY TOTAL RET'N 21.834 334.72 
PHOENIX GROWTH FUND 126.826 2,583.45 
8 .23 
39 .32 
2.5% 
1.5% 
11.5% 
83.5% 
PORTFOLIO TOTALS: $ 2,918.16$ 47.55 1.6% 100.0% 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
02-08-199:; o2:57PM FIRST WESTERN ADUISORS 5213539 P. 04 
0 2 / 0 8 / 1 9 9 5 
FIRST WESTERN ADVISORS Cash Flow Analysis 
DAVID A. RUSSON 
V.P. INVESTMENTS 
PORTFOLIO OWNER: Cuinmings, Joint Acct 
ACCOUNT NUilBER: 05544122 
Security 
Description Quantity Value 
Cash 
Flow Yield 
S of 
Holdings 
KEHPEii HIGH YIELD B 640.231 4,884.96 
KEYSTONE LIQUID TRST 11,393.510 11,393.51 
PUTNAM GROWTH & INC 627.041 8,352.19 
484.01 
398.77 
376.22 
9.9% 
3.5% 
4 .5% 
13 .8% 
4 5 . 3 % 
33 .9% 
PORTFOLIO TOTALS: 1 4 , 6 3 0 . 6 6 $ 1 , 2 5 9 . 0 1 5 . 1 % 1C; .0% 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
l
* •"•.••. I. » \ 02-08-19S , is 20PM •...,-. FIRST WESTERN ADUIS: ?S V J5213539 P .02 
0 2 / 0 8 / 1 9 9 5 DAVID A. RUSSOH 
FIRST WESTERN ADVISORS Cash Flow A n a l y s i s V . P . INVESTMENTS 
PORTFOLIO OWNER: Cuimnings Family TRST 
ACCOUNT NUMBER: 548888 
S e c u r i t y Cash % of 
D e s c r i p t i o n Quant i ty Value Flow Y i e l d Ho ld ings 
FID, ADV/ H-T MUNI 2 f 5 5 3 . 1 1 1 29,233,12 2 , 0 7 3 . 1 3 7.1% 100.0% 
PORTFOLIO TOTALS: $ 29,233.12$ 2 , 0 7 3 . 1 3 7.1% 100.0% 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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DAVID A. McPIIIE (2216) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2105 East Murray-Holladay Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
(801) 278-3700 
my SENT \ 
t « XV V 2 7 1W 
A L T ! . . • ' • ! • ; " . ' . ; o v . ; . 
By. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-:rk y 
- o o O o o — 
OLETTA CUMMINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
ON REMAND 
^ ^ ^ ^ 
Civil No. 924903713 DA 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
—ooOoo— 
THIS MATTER came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Iwasaki in his courtroom 
located at 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on Monday the 6th day of March, 1995, at 
the hour of 8:30 o'clock a.m. The Plaintiff appeared personally and by and through her attorney 
of record, David A. McPhie, The Defendant also appeared personally and through his attorney 
of record, Earl Spafford. 
The Plaintiff testified as to jurisdiction and grounds and other substantive matters in 
support of her proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as did the Certified Public 
Accountant, Stephen F. Petersen. A Motion was made for the publication of all volumes of the 
deposition of C. Kay Cummings. Said Motion was granted. 
The Court having considered the file, the testimony, the deposition of C. Kay Cummings, 
1 
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the documents submitted to court in connection with the default hearing and as attached to the 
depositions, and good cause appearing therefore, and having previously published its Findings of 
Fact and conclusions of Law, signed a Decree of Divorce in this matter dated the 7th day of April, 
1995. 
The Defendant appealed the Decree of Divorce entered to the Court of Appeals, and the 
Court of Appeals remanded the matter back to the District Court for further proceedings on 
specific issues (a copy of the Remand Order is attached to the Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on Remand as Exhibit A). 
The matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki upon remand 
from the Court of Appeals on the 11th day of August, 1997, and again on the 22nd day of 
September, 1997. At the remand hearings, the parties were present and were represent by their 
legal counsel of record, i.e. David A. McPhie for the Plaintiff, and M. Byron Fisher for the 
Defendant. 
At the remand hearings, the Court received expert testimony and reports and exhibits from 
the Court appointed expert witness David T. Posey. The Plaintiff and Defendant examined the 
witness David Posey through counsel, and subsequently the Court published its Findings 
concerning the fair market value of the business known as C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. 
This matter came on for further hearing on November 19, 1997, at the hour of 1:30 o'clock 
p.m., where the Court heard proffers of fact and argument from counsel concerning the effect the 
Court's new findings should have on the overall distribution of property, and to consider the 
objections each party had filed to the other's proposed Amended Findings. 
The Court having considered the arguments of counsel and the proffers made, overruled 
2 
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the objections of the Defendant to the Plaintiffs proposed Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
The Court noted at the hearing on November 19, 1997, that it had previously, at the time 
of the original Decree in April 1995, left open for further consideration, the question as to what 
the fair monthly rental or lease value of the building located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah was. 
The issue as to the fair monthly lease or iental value of said I>ililding came on for 
evidentiary hearing before the Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki on the 13th day of April, 1998, 
at the hour of 2:00 o'clock p.m. The Plaintiff appeared in person and through her attorney of 
record, David A. McPhie. The Defendant appeared personally and through his attorney of record 
M. Byron Fisher. 
The Court having heard testimony, proffers, the arguments of counsel, and good cause 
appearing therefore, published its Findings concerning the fair market lease value of said building 
and real estate. (A copy of the separate Findings and Order from that hearing is attached hereto 
as Exhibit A.) 
The Court, having now conducted all the hearings necessary to, and in connection with all 
the issues on remand, and reserved for further hearing at the time of trial, and having previously 
published its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Remand, now enters the 
following; 
AMENDED ORDER, JUDGMENT, AND DECREE OF DIVORCE ON REMAND 
3 
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1. The Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, the same to 
become final upon the signing and entry hereof. 
2. The Court makes no Order concerning the custody of children or related issues in 
that all the minor children of the parties are emancipated. 
3. The Plaintiff is awarded $1,633.00 per month as and for alimony. Said alimony 
shall terminate upon the Plaintiff's death or remarriage, or as otherwise provided as a matter of 
law. 
4. The Defendant is ordered to cooperate with the Plaintiff to maintain her on his 
current policy of health and accident insurance, which he currently has through his place of 
employment, and to cooperate with her to extend to her said coverage under the "Cobra" 
provisions of federal law as long as it may be maintained. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay her share 
I of the premium for said coverage. 
5. The Court declares the Cummings Family Trust that the Defendant attempted to 
establish in 1984 void ab initio. 
6. The Court declares the actions taken to remove Oletta Cummings as an officer and 
director of C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., void. The court declares Oletta Cummings to be the 
vice-president of such corporation and a member of its Board of Directors. 
7. The Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against the Defendant, C. Kay Cummings, 
personally and the Corporation, C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. for arrearages in land lease 
payments in the amount of $36,000.00. The Defendant and the corporation shall be jointly and 
severally liable for the judgment. 
8. The Plaintiff is awarded further judgment against the Defendant in the amount of 
4 
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$2,857.31 for reasonable attorney and paralegal fees. All previous temporary awards of attorneys 
fees are affirmed. 
9. The Defendant is ordered to pay or, to cause to be paid to the Plaintiff, by C. Kay 
Cummings, Inc., the sum of $5,560.00 per month triple net (meaning the Defendant shall pay all 
taxes and insurance etc., on the building in addition to the monthly rental payment) as ongoing 
rent or lease payment on the property and building, located at 2057 East 3300 South, commencing 
May 1, 1998. 
The Court notes that the Defendant has stated in open court his intention to vacate the 
subject premises rather than remain in the premises under this new higher lease obligation. It is 
the order of the Court that should the Defendant remain in the premises, that he execute a lease 
agreement with the Plaintiff bearing standard terms, and providing for a $5,560.00 per month 
triple net lease payment to the Plaintiff. 
Should the Defendant not sign a lease, or not pay the new lease payment, or fail to vacate 
the subject premises within a reasonable period of time, the Plaintiff may bring this matter back 
before the Court for an eviction order. 
10. The Plaintiff is awarded the following property as her sole and separate property, 
free and clear of any claim of the Defendant: 
A. The home and real estate located at 1134 Herbert Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
B. A 75% interest in the ground located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, in which the business building is located, as a tenant in common 
with the Defendant. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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C. A 75% interest in the building located at 2057 East 3300 South, located on 
the above described land, as tenant in common with the Defendant. 
D. One-half of the First Western Advisors and Smith Barney Accounts, as 
described in the Findings of Fact with values totaling $227,918.00 or 
$113,959.00, to her. 
E. All personal property currently located in the home and real estate located 
at 1134 Herbert Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah and the jewelry currently in 
the Defendant's possession (the collateral), but exempting out the stamp and 
coin collections, which are awarded to the Defendant. 
11. The Defendant is ordered to assume and pay the debt and obligation owed to Helen 
Rappaport and Alan S. Cohen on the land and building at 2057 East 3300 South, where the candy 
business is located in the amount of approximately which had a balance owing as of Mart 17, 1998 
I of approximately $321.684.00 as his sole and separate debt, and to hold the Plaintiff harmless 
from any liability thereon. 
12. The Defendant is ordered to immediately execute and deliver to the Plaintiff Quit 
Claim Deeds to the house, land and building described above. The Defendant is further ordered 
to cause C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., or the so-called "Cummings Family Trust" to also 
execute said Quit Claim Deeds to the Plaintiff as may be necessary. 
13. The Defendant is awarded the following property: 
A. All of the equipment, materials, stock, accounts receivable, retained 
earnings, and other personal property of C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc., 
J including the van, blue sky, and the on-going right to operate the business 
6 
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in the name of C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. 
B. All of the Defendant's clothing and personal effects, and personal property 
currently in his possession, except the jewelry referred to above. The 
Defendant is awarded the stamp collection and coin collection, referred to 
above. 
C. One-half of the Smith Barney and First Western Advisors stock and 
retirement accounts. 
D. A 25% interest in the building and real estate located at 2057 East 3300 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as a tenant in common with the Plaintiff. 
14. Except as provided for above, each of the parties is ordered to assume and pay their 
own debts and obligations incurred subsequent to separation, which was in July 1992, and hold 
the other harmless thereon. 
15. Should subsequent motions be brought before the court or its Commissioner for 
enforcement of the terms of this decree, the substantially prevailing party shall be awarded all their 
costs of court and actual and reasonable attorneys fees incurred in bringing said action or 
defending against it as the case may be. 
DATED this ^ / d a y of ^ V ' v y . 1998. 
BY THE COU 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED 
DECREE OF DIVORCE ON REMAND to the following, postage prepaid this ^0%day of 
, 1995: y , M ^ 
M. Byron Fisher 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street, Suite 1200 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
D:\WP61\CL1ENTS\CUMMINGS\AMD-DEC.REM 
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DAVID A. McPHIE (2216) 
Attorney at Law 
2105 E. Murray-Holladay Rd. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
(801)278-3700 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
OLETTA CUMMINGS, : ORDER ESTABLISHING FAIR 
: MARKET LEASE VALUE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
: Civil No. 924903713 DA 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS, : 
: Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Defendant. : 
—ooOoo-
II IE MATTER of the Plaintiffs Motion to Establish the Fair Market Lease Value of the 
building located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki in his courtroom located at 450 South State Street, Salt Lake 
I City, Utah, on Monday the 13th day of April, 1998, at the hour of 2:00 o'clock p.m. 
The matter was set for an evidentiary hearing. The Plaintiff appeared personally, and was 
represented by her attorney of record David A. McPhie. The Defendant appeared personally and 
was represented by his attorney of record M. Byron Fisher. 
The Court received sworn testimony from the witnesses C. Kay Cummings, and David 
Posey, C.P.A., who were examined and cross examined by counsel, along with a stipulation of 
1 
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the parties that the fair market lease value of the subject real estate, that is the building located at 
2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, is $7,414.00 per month, triple net. The parties 
informed the Court that they had reached the stipulation based on the fact that the Plaintiffs 
appraiser one Kerry Jorgensen, had appraised the property as having a fair market monthly lease 
value of $7,644.00 per month triple net, and the Defendant's appraiser, one Paul W. Thronson, 
had appraised the property of having a fair monthly lease market value of $7,185.00 per month 
triple net. The parties, tlirough counsel, stipulated that they had agreed to split the difference. 
The Court considered the argument of counsel and the evidence, and the file. The Court 
noted that the Decree of Divorce in this matter specifically provides in paragraph 9 thereof as 
follows; 
"The Defendant is ordered to pay or, to cause to be paid to the Plaintiff, by C. Kay 
Cummings, Inc., the sum of $3,000.00 per month s ongoing rent or lease payment 
on the property and building located at 2057 East 3300 South, until such time as 
the fair monthly leasehold value of the land and building can be agreed upon or 
established by court order." 
The Court notes that this court has formerly ruled as is outlined in the transcript from the 
I hearing dated November 19, 1997, that the issue of the Defendant's obligation to both pay the 
underlying mortgage obligation on the property, and a fair lease payment on the property to the 
owner thereof is a "dead issue". Having considered all of the above, the court now makes the 
following: 
ORDER 
1. The Court finds and determines that the fair market lease value of the subject real 
2 
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estate located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, is the amount stipulated to by the 
parties, that is $7,414.00 per month triple net, meaning with the tenant paying all the taxes and 
insurance, etc., on the property in addition to this monthly figure. 
2. The Court has previously determined as part of its hearing on remand in this 
matter, that the Defendant should be awarded a one quarter (1/4) interest in the subject building 
and real estate, therefore, it is not fair that he pay 100% of the fair lease value of the property to 
his former wife, but rather that he should pay 75% thereof. 
3. Effective May 1, 1998, the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff 3/4 of the fair 
market leave value of the building and real estate per month as a lease payment, that is the sum 
of $5,560.00 per month. This shall be a triple net monthly obligation with the Defendant also 
responsible to pay all of the taxes and insurance, etc., on the building during the period of his 
occupancy. 
4. The Court notes that the Defendant has stated in open court his intention to vacate 
the subject premises rather than remain in the premises under this new liigher lease obligation. It 
is the order of the Court that should the Defendant remain in the premises, that he execute a lease 
agreement with the Plaintiff bearing standard terms, and providing for a $5,560.00 per month 
triple net lease payment to the Plaintiff. 
5. Should the Defendant not sign a lease, or not pay the new lease payment, or fail to 
vacate the subject premises within a reasonable period of time, the Plaintiff may bring this matter 
back before the Court for an eviction order. 
6. Each of the parties is ordered to bcai then own costs of court and attorney's fees 
incurred in bringing and maintaining their respective positions with regard to this Motion. 
3 
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DATED this day of , 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Establishing 
Fair Market Lease Value to the following, postage prepaid this O^ CM^  Day of 
,1998: vAu^ 
M. Byron Fisher 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street, Suite 1200 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Sally Hutchings 0~~ 
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DAVID A. McPHIE(2216) 
Attorney at Law 
2105 E. Murray-Holladay Rd. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
(801) 278-3700 
FILED DISTHICY COURT 
Third Judicial Dis'T'ct 
:c 11998 
r 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
OLETTA CUMMINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON THE PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR CONTEMPT 
Civil No. 924903713 DA 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Comm: Michael S. Evans 
-ooOoo-
THE MATTER of the Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki in his courtroom located at 450 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on Friday, the 30th day of October, 1998, at the hour of 1:30 o'clock p.m. 
The Plaintiff Oletta Cummings appeared in person and by and through her attorney of 
record David A. McPhie. The Defendant Clyde Kay Cummings appeared in person and by and 
through his attorney of record M. Byron Fisher. 
The Court noted at the time of hearing, the Plaintiffs Motions for Judgment and 
Concerning the Putnam Account dated October 22, 1998, and the Plaintiffs Motion for Delivery 
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of Proceeds in Escrow dated September 30, 1998, were also scheduled to be heard. 
The Court previously issued an Order in this matter allowing the parties to bring their 
disputes in this case directly to this Court, as an exception to the rule as contained in Section 
6-401(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The Court has done this in an attempt to 
expedite matters in this case. 
It is no longer in the best interest of the parties or the Court, to continue to hear these 
matters directly. It is the order of the court that all further future proceedings in this matter, 
including Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment and for an Order Concerning the Putnam Account 
dated October 22, 1998, and the Plaintiffs Motion for Delivery of Proceeds in Escrow dated 
September 30, 1998, already on file, be first presented to the Court's Honorable Commissioner 
assigned to this case Commissioner Evans, as provided for in said rule. 
The Court having considered the contempt issue fully, having earlier, in its Order dated 
February 17th, 1998, in which the court took the matter of contempt under advisement, and 
having taken up the Plaintiffs renewed request for a contempt finding on September 21st, 1998, 
which hearing was continued and reconsidered again on October 14th, 1998, and continued again j! 
and considered on October 30th, 1998, and having considered the file, and the items of evidence 
introduced by the parties, along with the testimony presented at hearing, and good cause 
appearing therefore, now makes the following; 
FINDINGS AND ORDER 
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With regard to the Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt, the Court notes makes the following 
findings. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Concerning The Alleged Non-Cooperation 
1. This Court ordered Mr. Cummings at the hearing held February 17th, 1998, to 
"cooperate with the Plaintiff in her attempts to obtain refinancing to stop 
foreclosure." 
2. This Court subsequently approved a specific loan negotiated by the Plaintiff, and 
ordered the parties to close on the loan. 
3. That on the date set for closing, Mr. Cummings attended the closing, but would 
not sign the Deed of Trust and would not acknowledge the Lease signed by the board of directors j 
of C. Kay Cummings Candies. 
4. That Mr. Cummings stated in his testimony that one of his reasons for not 
acknowledging the lease at closing, was that there was ambiguity on the face of the lease in that 
the language said that it was a triple-net lease, but other places in the lease indicated that the 
landlord would pay property taxes and other items. 
5o The Court finds that this reason given by the Defendant is disingenuous, that 
testimony is lacking in credibility. He did not ask about or try to clear up the claimed ambiguity 
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in the lease. The court finds that Mr. Cummings did not acknowledge the lease on the date of 
closing because he wanted better lease terms, similar to those that had been offered to him 
earlier, during a period of negotiation between the parties, and prior to the Court's Order setting 
the fair market lease value of the premises. 
6. The Court finds that the Defendant's contention that he did not acknowledge the 
lease at the time of closing, was because a lease had been signed by a man named Gearle Brooks, 
whom he had never appointed to the Board of Directors, is specious and without merit. The 
Court further finds that this stated reason for not acknowledging the lease, and closing the loan 
was again motivated by his desire for better lease terms, and a belief on his part that by 
sabotaging the financing, he could extract from the Plaintiff either better lease terms, or a more 
favorable settlement of the case. 
7. In making these findings, the Court comes to no conclusion about the validity of 
the lease, as it is not the issue. The issue is "cooperation". 
8. In making these findings, the Court notes that the documents identified and 
admitted as P-4 and P-9 show that Mr. Cummings did in fact appoint Gearle Brooks, and that 
according to the State of Utah Division of Corporations, Gearle Brooks was a director of the 
corporation as of the time the lease was signed. The Court further finds based on the testimony 
of Mrs. Cummings, and Gordon Cummings, which testimony was uncontroverted, that Mr. 
Gearle Brooks did attend Board of Director's meetings, did have proposed to him as a member of 
the Board of Directors, and did vote on management decisions concerning the corporation C. 
Kay Cummings Candy Inc., and was treated, and did act as, a member of the Board of Directors. 
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The Court finds that Gearle Brooks, and Jeffery Brooks, are the same person. There may have 
been confusion as to Mr. Brooks' first name, but there was no confusion about his appointment 
as a director. 
9. The Court further finds that if Mr. Cummings removed Mr. Brooks as a director, 
he did not do so until after the lease was signed. 
10. The Court further finds that Mr. Cummings refused, and did fail to sign the listing 
agreement as he was ordered to do as a result of the hearing held May 19th, 1998, and that when 
presented with a subsequent renewal listing agreement after the original listing agreement had 
run out, signed the original expired listing agreement, but not the then current listing agreement. 
11. The Court finds that Mr. Cummings' failure to cooperate in signing the Deed of 
Trust and the document acknowledging the lease referred to above, caused the financing which 
Mrs. Cummings was granted the exclusive right to negotiate, and the financing which the Court 
had specifically approved, to be lost, and the deal to not close. The Court further finds that the 
five year lease required by Bank One, who offered the financing the Court had approved, was the 
only option the parties had, and that financing could nol be obtained without such a lease. The 
Court finds that Mr. Cummings knew that, and intentionally failed to acknowledge the lease at 
the time of closing for the purposes of sabotaging the loan. The Court finds that Mr. Cummings' 
sabotage of the loan was in violation of the Court's order that he cooperate to close the loan, and 
that he did so for the purposes of trying to obtain leverage in negotiations with Mrs. Cummings 
to obtain better terms than he has obtained by the Court's orders as contained in the Amended 
Decree of Divorce on Remand, and by subsequent Court order concerning the fair market lease 
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value of the property and other orders. 
12. The Court further finds that Mr. Cummings' failure to cooperate to close the loan, 
at a time when foreclosure was pending on the property, caused the Plaintiff Mrs. Cummings to 
have to sell the property in order to avoid foreclosure, an option which she would preferred not to 
use, and which she should not have had to use. 
13. The Court in making these findings notes that Mr. Cummings previously had his 
answer stricken and his default entered in the underlying divorce matter because he would not 
cooperate in the discovery process in divorce. The Court specifically does not consider Mr. 
Cummings' prior acts resulting in his default, in its findings on contempt. The Court does 
however, as described in Rule 404(b) consider Mr. Cummings' history in considering proof of 
the contempt alleged with regard to motive, opportunity, intent, his plan, and when considering 
the evidence concerning absence of mistake or accident. 
Findings With Regard To Failure To Pay 
13. This Court ordered Mr. Cummings on April 13th, 1998, to do a number of things. 
They were; 
B. 
To pay the sum of $2,816.67 per month into a trust account, in the place of 
the monthly payments he had been previously making on the Note to 
Cohen and Rappaport. 
To pay the sum of $14,083.35 for the arrearages on the Note which had 
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arisen between November 1997 and March 1998. 
C. To pay the sum of $39,000.00 which was the penalty he incurred when he 
allowed the loan on the building which he was ordered to pay to go into 
foreclosure. 
D. In that Mr. Cummings' testimony at the time was that the holders of the 
note would not accept payment for fear of a novation, Mr. Cummings was 
further ordered on April 13th, 1998, to either pay these to the note holder, 
or; 
" . . . in the alternative, into a separate trust account to be 
established by the parties to hold said monies for the benefit of the 
Plaintiff..." 
E. Further, he was ordered to pay said amounts "as soon as possible." 
F. At a subsequent hearing on May 19th, 1998, Mr. Cummings was ordered, 
when he had failed to set up a payment schedule, or make any proposal for 
payment to; 
"The Defendant has until July 15th, 1998 to establish a payment 
schedule for the payment of the remainder of the monies he was 
ordered to pay.. ." 
15. Based on the uncontroverted evidence at trial, the Court finds that Mr. Cummings 
did not pay any amount on the $2,816.67 per month obligation ordered. 
16. He did not pay any amount on the $14,000.00 obligation ordered. 
17. He did not pay any amount on the $39,000.00 amount ordered. 
18. He did not set up a trust account in which to put said monies if he had paid them. 
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19. I Ie did not make any proposal to opposing counsel for payment of these sums of 
money before or after July 15th, 1998. 
20. The Court specifically does not find that Mr. Cummings had the ability to pay all 
of these amounts of money. The Court does however, find that Mr. Cummings could have paid 
something on these amounts and that specifically, he had the ability to pay the $2,816.67 per 
month as ordered. 
21. The Court further finds that Mr. Cummings could have set up the trust account 
that he was ordered to set up, could have made a proposal for payment to opposing counsel, and 
could have paid something on the $14,000.00 amount, and the $39,000.00 amount that he was 
ordered to pay. The Court further finds that Mr. Cummings did not even attempt or try to obey 
any of these orders. 
22. The Court notes in making these findings, that Mr. Cummings may have correctly 
believed that he could not fully comply with the court's orders, but this does not excuse his 
failure to even attempt to comply, or to have paid what he could. 
Based on the above Findings of Fact, the Court concludes of a matter of law that; 
1. An Order should enter holding Mr. Cummings in contempt. 
2. Mr. Cummings should be sentenced appropriately on said contempt. 
3. Judgment for damages in connection with said contempt should be reserved for 
subsequent hearing before the Commissioner. 
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4. The Plaintiff should be awarded her costs of court and attorney's fees in this 
2 matter not under the general provisions for awarding costs of court and attorney's fees on 
3 contempt, but as sanctions on contempt. 
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Based on the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court makes the 
following; 
ORDER 
1. The Defendant Clyde Kay Cummings is hereby held in contempt for his failure to 
cooperate in obtaining financing and closing the loan with Bank One referred to in the findings 
above. The Defendant Clyde Kay Cummings is further held in contempt for his failure to pay 
anything, or to even try to comply with the Court's orders concerning payment of the $2,816.67 
per month, the $14,083.35 and the $39,000.00 amounts referred to in the Court's order of April 
13th, 1998. 
2. The Defendant Clyde Kay Cummings, as a sentence on said contempt, ordered to 
serve twenty (20) days of incarceration in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
3. The Defendant Clyde Kay Cummings is allowed to purge himself of said 
contempt and avoid serving said jail sentence by paying the reasonable costs of court and 
attorney's fees of counsel for the Plaintiff as sanctions on contempt in the amount of $7,787.80. 
Said fees are awarded as sanctions against the Defendant Mr. Cummings after review of 
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Plaintiffs counsel's affidavit for attorney's fees, and any objections which may have been filed 
thereto. Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment for said fees. 
4. The Defendant is ordered to pay said fees in payments of $ 1,000.00 per month 
starting on December 1st, 1998, and $1,000.00 on the 1st of each month thereafter until paid. As 
long as the defendant pays strictly in accordance with the payment plan outlined immediately 
above, the Plaintiff shall be stayed from collecting on her judgment awarded in paragraph 3 
above. Should the Defendant fail to pay exactly as ordered, the stay on execution of the 
judgment shall be permanently lifted and the Defendant shall immediately commence serving the 
twenty day jail sentence, sy 
DATED this / day of I JCT^- ' ,1998. 
Honorable Judge Glenn K. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on the 
Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt to the following, postage prepaid this lD'uDay of 
(NJoMMfl-W^ , 1998: 
M. Byron Fisher 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street, Suite 1200 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
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DAVID A. McPHIE (2216) 
Attorney at Law 
2105 E. Murray-I-Iolladay Rd. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
(801)278-3700 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
RLESt»*»ii*«i*« bootti 
Third Judicial District 
• ^ S ^ -O-.-Oft^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo-
OLETTA CUMMINGS, JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff. 
IMAGED 
VS. 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS, 
Defendant. 
i ENTERED IN REGISTRY l 
" OF JUDGMENTS 
owe, &mi%^fiXu>> 
Civil No. 924903713 DA 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Comm: Michael S. Evans 
—ooOoo--
THE MATTER of the Plaintiffs Motion for a Judgment on Real Estate, and her Motion 
for an Order Concerning the Putnam Account, came on for hearing before the Court's Honorable 
Commissioner Michael S. Evans in his courtroom located at 450 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on Tuesday, the 29th day of December, 1998, at the hour of 11:00 o'clock a.m. 
The Plaintiff appeared in person and through her attorney of record, David A. McPhie. 
The Defendant did not appear in person, but Matt Anderson appeared in the place of Byron 
Fisher, counsel of record for the Defendant. 
The Commissioner heard proffers of evidence, and argument in support of, and in 
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David A. 
McPhie 
Attorney 
At Law 
opposition to the Motion for Judgment on the Real Estate, and based on the stipulation of the 
parties, continued hearing on the Motion regarding the Putnam account without date. 
Having considered the file, the facts and arguments proffered by counsel, and good cause 
appearing therefore, the Commissioner made a recommendation dispositive of all issues 
regarding the Motion. 
The Court having noted that no objection has been filed to the form of this proposed 
order, and subject to either party's right to seek review of the Commissioner's recommendation 
in the District Court in the manner provided for by law, now adopts the recommendation of the 
Commissioner and enters the following: 
JUDGMENT 
1. The Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant in the sum of 
$197,611.31 which represents the difference between what the Plaintiff should have received, 
and would have received at closing, if the Defendant had paid the underlying mortgage 
obligation on the real estate located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as he was 
ordered to do both in the original Decree of Divorce, and the Amended Decree of Divorce on 
Remand. 
2. In addition, the Plaintiff is further awarded judgment against the Defendant in the 
sums of $36,225.00 and $12,075.00 which represent real estate commissions paid to both 
agent(s) in connection with the sale of said real estate. 
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3. I he Plaintiff is further awarded judgment against the Defendant in the sum of 
$3,760.00 which represents the costs of sale as outlined on the "Sellors Final Closing Statement" 
associated with the sale of the property located at 2057 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
September 21st, 1998. 
4. The Plaintiff is further awarded a judgment against the Defendant for attorney's 
fees incurred in bringing and maintaining her motion for judgment in the sum of $990.00. 
5. The total judgment entered against the Defendant in favor of the Plaintiff is in the 
sum of $250,661.31. 
DATED this, day of 
_, 1999. 
BY THE COURT 
Honorable Judge CjlennlC. Iwasaki 
Approved as fairly reflecting the 
recommendation of the Commissioner: 
Commissioner Michael S. Evans ' ' 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment to the 
following, postage prepaid this 'f"fo Day of ^(WjJdLk^k^ , 1999: 
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M. Byron Fisher 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street, Suite 1200 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
11 
David A. 
McPhie 
Attorney 
At Law 
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DAVID A. McPHIE(2216) 
Attorney at Law 
2105 E. Murray-llolladay Rd. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
(801)278-3700 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo— 
OLETTA CUMMINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLYDE KAY CUMMINGS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON THE PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
1 
2 
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Civil No. 924903713 DA 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Comm: Michael S. Evans 
-ooOoo— 
TI IE MATTER of the Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the jewelry came on for 
hearing before the Court's Honorable Commissioner Michael S. Evans in his courtroom located 
at 450 South Stale Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, on Monday, the 29th day of March, 1999, at the 
hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m. 
The Plaintiff appeared personally and through her attorney of record David A. McPhie. 
The Defendant appeared personally and through his attorney of record M. Byron Fisher. 
The Commissioner heard proffers and argument in support of, and in opposition to the 
Motion. 
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Ill 1 laving considered the file, the arguments and proffers of counsel, arid good cause 
211 therefore, the Commissioner made a recommendation dispositive of all issues. 
311 The Court noting that no objection has been filed to the form of this proposed order, and 
411 subject to either party's right to seek review of the substance of the Commissioner's 
5 || recommendation in the manner provided for by law, now adopts the recommendation of the 
611 Commissioner as its own; 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
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The Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant in the following 
amounts: 
A. $9,410.00 in principal. 
B. $ 1,952.02 in interest at the judgment rate of 9.22%, from the date the stay 
was lifted i.e. the 19th day of December, 1996, to the date of judgment. 
C. Attorney's fees in the sum of $450.00. 
2. For a total judgment of $11,812.02. 
DATED this day of , 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
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